Mattole, Nongatl, Sinkyone, Lassik, Wailaki, and Cahto. However, this is a minimal figure. The true number of Athapaskans alive in 1972 is probably much greater than is indicated by the 1928 roll. Also of interest are the Yokuts. Although Kroeber and Heizer do not list them, the 1928 roll contains the names of approximately 200 Yokuts, whose affiliation is attested by mention of some 15 tribelets, all from the southern San Joaquin valley and adjacent foothills.

The larger tribal units, such as the Yurok, Hupa, Pomo, Achumawi (Pit River Indians), Paiute, and many others are well represented in the roll. There can be no doubt concerning their persistence as recognized Indian entities, many with tribal councils and other forms of local government. It is Kroeber and Heizer's achievement that they demonstrated similar continuity in the existence of the smaller, almost invisible ethnic elements.

Redistribution of Population

Aboriginally in California the Indians were hunter-gatherers who lived uniformly distributed through the food-producing regions and who formed no larger aggregates than the village of at most several hundred inhabitants. After the invasion by the Whites they tended to adhere as far as possible to the old pattern and gravitated to small settlements located in relatively isolated rural areas. Then, in the late nineteenth century, there began a migration, at first slow, of the younger generation from their remote enclaves to the centers of White population. This movement toward urbanization has accelerated during the twentieth century. It has been favored by the demand for labor during two world wars and has been notably facilitated by the ready availability of the automobile as a source of transportation.

The magnitude of the migration toward the cities can be evaluated quantitatively in several ways. One approach is to follow the distribution of residence according to county. The rural portions of northern California were well covered by Kelsey (1971) for his census of the nonreservation Indians in 1905-1906. A block of 14 counties in the northeastern part of the state, which contains no reservations, and which extends from Siskiyou to Calaveras, showed a count of 3,787 persons. The 1970 census (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1971) gives for these same counties 5,882 Indians. Meanwhile, according to Kelsey, the seven counties bordering San Francisco Bay held only 83 Indians. For Marin and San Mateo counties he used the figures from the 1900 census; there were 43 in Alameda County and none whatever in the others. The 1970 census gives a total of 17,107 for the seven counties, most of whom were born in California. Even if some immigrants from others states are included, the increase in 65 years is prodigious. It is unfortunate that Kelsey could give no estimate for Los Angeles County.

Another device is to examine the addresses given by the applicants whose names are on the 1928 and the

1950 rolls at the office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs at Sacramento. In many instances only the post office is mentioned, but even so a judgment can be made concerning the size of the locality. In other instances a street address is given, a sure indication of removal to an urban environment. This method, applied to the 1928 roll, formed the basis of a study (Cook 1943d:40-41) in which it was concluded that "whenever the native race, in California, has entered upon a period of intensified contact with the whites, there has been a response in the form of emigration . . ." and that "the direction of migration has been uniformly toward the centers of white population with the result that an Indian urban class has come into existence." In this study it was found that in the 1928 roll 11 percent of the names recorded had street addresses. Furthermore, of the migrants within the state, 40 percent were living in cities, whereas this condition was true for only 7.4% of the nonmigrants.

A random sample consisting of 20,023 names was taken from the 1950 roll. Of these, 18.1% were living in homes with street addresses. It was also observed that 9.3% lived outside the state of California, mostly in Oregon and Nevada; 6.1% were within the San Francisco Bay area; and 6.0% inhabited Los Angeles County. These percentages were significantly increased by 1970. It is highly probable, therefore, that urbanization continued unabated between the dates of the three enumerations, from 1928 to 1970.

A third method is offered by the United States censuses, in particular the volume on California of the 1970 census. The number of Indians counted in the state was 91,018. Concerning this figure it must be emphasized that *all* Indians, not merely descendants of California inhabitants of 1848, are included. The migration from elsewhere accounts for most of the discrepancy between the census report and the 1970 roll compiled by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which shows only about 70,000 names.

With the census reporting 17,107 Indians in the San Francisco Bay area and 24,509 in Los Angeles County (of whom half are probably immigrants), it is clear that close to 45 percent of all Indians in the state are concentrated in the two great metropolitan areas. The 1970 volume on California (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1971:66, table 17) designates 69,802 persons, or 76.7%, as "urban" and 21,216, or 23.3%, as "rural." Of the rural component 1,671 live in places of 1,000 to 2,500 inhabitants, and the remaining 19,545, or approximately 21.5%, still adhere to the type of settlement that was common to their ancestors.

The broad conclusion from all these pieces of evidence must be that the California Indian in the 1970s is moving as rapidly into the urban, industrial environment as are the Californians of other ethnic origins and that the redistribution of the aboriginal native population is substantially complete.

The Impact of Euro-American Exploration and Settlement

EDWARD D. CASTILLO

Traditionally California Indians have been portrayed in history as a docile primitive people who openly embraced the invading Spaniards and were rapidly subdued. This simplistic contention adds little to a realistic understanding of native history in California and undoubtedly is derived from crude feelings of racial superiority on the part of its advocates. As a part of a larger reevaluation of Indian-White relations in history, the story of California Indians must be reassessed incorporating as much native documentation as possible. The extent of primary resource data written or dictated by Indians in the past is surprisingly broad and will be used here to complement more traditional sources of information.

The cultural legacy of the Spanish-speaking persons who invaded California in 1769 was far different from that of the nearly 300,000 unconquered natives living there. In contrast to the Indians, these Hispanos (of African, American Indian, and Spanish descent) were members of an authoritarian empire whose society was populous, complex, and widespread. Further, they were steeped in a legacy of religious intolerance and conformity featuring a messianic fanaticism accentuating both Spanish culture in general and Catholicism in particular. Hispanos invading Alta California also possessed a political philosophy that condoned large-scale duplicity in order to gain goals not revealed to the peoples being dealt with. Perhaps most important, these Iberians were heirs to a culture with a history of almost constant warfare stressing conquest.

The tribal Americans in California lived in societies whose major concepts and institutions present striking differences. For instance, California Indians lived in relatively small political units usually made up of 50 to 500 persons (Kroeber 1962). Anthropologists have confirmed that over 300 different dialects were spoken in aboriginal California. Organization for war was difficult since tribes were generally democracies and the majority decided most issues facing the tribe. Concepts of conquest by invasion and exploitation were foreign to them. Closely related to their lack of conquering and exploiting other peoples is the almost total lack of experience in organizing and carrying out wars. This fact becomes even more amazing considering California had a higher preconquest population density per square mile than

any other region in North America (Kroeber 1939a:153). The significance of this high population, multiplicity of tribes, and lack of warfare seems to have gone unrecognized by sociologists who generally agree that linguistic and cultural differences together with high population density afford many opportunities for friction and war among different groups. Yet this does not seem to have occurred in preconquest California. This aspect of California Indian society deserves more than the passing reference given here but unfortunately is outside the scope of this article.

The major factors that contributed to the changing social environment to which native peoples were forced to accommodate themselves were: hostile military campaigns, introduced labor systems, disease and epidemics, changing nutrition patterns, and colonial government relations. All these factors in one form or another contributed to the destruction of native life, property, culture, and society. Finally by considering the philosophy and laws and practices of colonial societies as background to the Indian history, a deeper and more sophisticated understanding of the tragedy that befell California's native people may be elicited.

The Spanish Period

Early sixteenth-century Spanish exploration north of New Spain was prompted by persistent rumors of a rich northern Indian civilization. These rumors consisted of a number of tales, the most famous of which became known as the "Seven Cities of Cíbola." These stories along with others became the core of a collection of legends known as the "Northern Mystery." In a series of northern explorations the Spanish Crown unsuccessfully attempted to discover "another Mexico." In conjunction with Francisco Coronado's expedition, both Hernando de Alarcón and Melchor Díaz commanded explorations that might have set foot in Alta California during 1540. However, most historians agree that Juan Rodríguez Cabrillo in 1542 was the first European to visit California. Sent out under the orders of Viceroy Antonio de Mendoza, the purpose of his expedition was to discover the long-rumored, though mythical, Straight of Anian (Northwest Passage). Sailing up the coast of California, Cabrillo visited the bay of San Diego, Catalina Island, San Pedro, and the Channel Islands area (Wagner 1929:73-93).

The next European visitor to the California coast was the English adventurer Francis Drake in 1579, who landed along the coast of Miwok territory, probably the Bodega Bay or Drake's Bay area. Staying among the friendly Miwok for five weeks, Drake mistook their ceremonies and hospitality as conferring some kind of religious veneration upon himself and his crew (Heizer 1947:264-269). The Englishmen then, like Cabrillo, declared this whole territory for the Imperial Crown by "right of discovery" and promptly departed.

Thereafter, California was looked upon by the Spanish authorities in Mexico primarily as a possible port of call for the annual Manila galleons on their way to Mexico. To establish ports, the Crown sponsored various expeditions to explore the coast of California. Sebastian Rodriguez Cermeño made a disastrous exploration in 1595, which ended in the destruction of his ship by storms at Drake's Bay (Wagner 1929:154-168). The merchant-adventurer Sebastián Vizcaíno made another exploration of the coast in 1602 in which he exaggeratedly reported a splendid harbor at Monterey (Wagner 1929:180-273). This myth of a harbor of Monterey played a central part in later plans for colonization of Alta California.

A lapse of 167 years intervened between Vizcaino's expedition and the first permanent European colony established in California. This long period of isolation after first contacts with the Spanish emphasized the low value placed on this territory. Unfortunately these were the last years of peace and contentment that California natives were to enjoy. For the next two centuries the Indians were locked in a violent struggle, first with the Spanish, then the Mexicans, and finally the Anglo invaders, in order to preserve their homes and way of life.

The consolidation of New Spain's northwestern frontier and its extension to Alta California seems to have been the result of the personal ambitions of the mentally unstable Visitor-General Jose de Gálvez. As a part of Spanish imperial reform under Charles III, Gálvez proposed the consolidation and development of Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Sonora, and California into a governmental unit called commandancy-general. Gálvez's justification for this reform was the perennial Spanish fear that the British or Russians might establish themselves on the Pacific Coast and menace Mexico from the north. He also believed that Alta California might ultimately provide a lucrative source of royal revenue (W. Bean 1973:31).

The visitor-general's plans for the colonization of Alta California were realized with the organization of the "sacred expedition" in 1769. This group of adventurers was divided between soldiers under the command of Capt. Gaspar de Portolá and missionary personnel under the leadership of Father President Junipero Serra (Crespí 1927: 20-50). There was a third contingent bringing by sea some supplies and church furniture. The objective of

the expedition was the founding of a presidio (military fort) and a mission at San Diego as a way station for the journey to establish a colony at Monterey. These contingents arrived in San Diego between April and July 1769. On July 16, 1769, they founded the first of 21 California missions (fig. 1), and the occupation of Alta California by imperial forces of Spain became a reality.




Fig. 1. Missions established in Alta California: a, San Diego de Alcalá, 1769; b, San Carlos Borromeo (Carmel), 1770; c, San Antonio de Padua, d, San Gabriel, 1771; e, San Luis Obispo de Tolosa, 1772; f, San Francisco de Asís (Dolores), g, San Juan Capistrano, 1776; h, Santa Clara, 1777; i, San Buenaventura (Ventura), 1782; j, Santa Bárbara, 1786; k, de la Purísima Concepción, 1787; l, Santa Cruz, m, de la Soledad, 1791; n, San Miguel, 1796; o, San Juan Bautista, p, San José, q, San Fernando Rey de España, 1797; r, San Luis Rey de Francia, 1798; s, Santa Inés (Ynez), 1804; t, San Rafael, 1817; u, San Francisco Solano (Sonoma), 1823 (Bowman 1965).

Spain's Indian policies at the time of the invasion of California were a mixture of economic, military, political, and religious motives. Indians were regarded by the Spanish government as subjects of the Crown and human beings capable of receiving the sacraments of Christianity (Hanke 1959:74). Other motives of the colonial system set up to regulate Spain's interests in the natives could be realized by the encomienda system, which called for the "giving of Indians" to—that is, requiring Indians to labor for—various Spanish citizens for the public good. In reality this institution was a vari-


ation of the feudal-manorial labor system. This encomienda system along with Christianization would ultimately absorb the Indian into the Spanish colonial society—at its lowest levels—and consolidate Spanish control over more territory.

When early explorers had encountered California natives they universally characterized Indians as shy and friendly people providing travelers with water, food, and hospitality whenever asked. However, permanent colonization almost from the beginning raised native suspicions and ultimately led to violence. The Ipai-Tipai among whom the San Diego mission and presidio were established proved to be reluctant hosts. Within a month they attacked the Spanish camp attempting to drive the invaders from their territory, but the Spanish soldiers using their guns defended their settlement and an uneasy peace ensued. Yet it would be another two years before Mission San Diego could record its first baptism (Bancroft 1886-1890, 1:138-139).

Over the ensuing half-century the Spanish soldiers, padres, and colonists established authority along the narrow coastal region stretching from San Diego north to Sonoma. In this territory the Spanish invaders estab-

lished their institutions of conquest and colonization: the mission, the presidio, and later the civil pueblo.

The mission was the most important institution used by the Spanish in the Americas to establish control of Indian territory and peoples. The type established in California was the reducción. This type of mission was established to gather natives living their free way of life in small scattered villages into one central mission site. Despite romantic interpretations found in literature and history, the California missions were coercive authoritarian institutions. It is impossible to understand the effect missionization had upon native Californians without realizing that once inside the mission system the neophytes, as converts were called, were not free to leave. Constantly under the absolute control of the Franciscans and soldiers, the Indians were forced to observe a rigid discipline (fig. 2). In order to enforce Catholic moral codes, at night unmarried men and women were separately incarcerated in unhealthy and crowded mission barracks. Whipping with a barbed lash, solitary confinement, mutilation, use of stocks and hobbles, branding, and even execution for both men and women characterized the "gentle yoke of Catholicism" introduced to the



Museo Naval, Madrid: ms. 1723-1.

Fig. 2. Indians of Mission San Carlos Borromeo at Carmel, lined up with military precision to greet the French exploring expedition under Jean François de Galaup de la Pérouse. Watercolor attributed to Tomás de Suría or José Cardero, 1791, after a lost original painted at the occasion by Gaspard Duché de Vancy, 1786.

neophytes (Cook 1943:91-135). An exneophyte from Mission San Luis Rey commented about cruelty in the missions: "When I was a boy the treatment of the Indians was not any good—they did not pay us anything they only gave us food, a loin cloth and a blanket every year, and many beatings for any mistake even if it [the mistake] was slight, it was more or less at the mercy of the administrator who ordered the beatings whenever and how many he felt like" (Cesar 1878:4). Lorenzo Asisara, a neophyte born at Santa Cruz Mission in 1819, reported that "the Spanish padres were very cruel to the Indians: they treated them very badly . . . and they made them work like slaves" (Asisara 1877:90-113). Father President Fermín Francisco de Lasuen rationalized such cruelties this way: "It is evident that a nation which is barbarous, ferocious and ignorant requires more frequent punishment than a nation which is cultured, educated and of gentle and moderate customs" (Cook 1943:124). However, not all of Lasuen's friars were in agreement with such practices. In 1799 Padre Antonio de la Concepción Horra of Mission San Miguel enraged his contemporaries by reporting to the viceroy in Mexico that the Franciscan Order in California was guilty of cruelty and mismanagement of Indians in their jurisdiction. Horra charged: "The treatment shown to the Indians is the most cruel I have ever read in history. For the slightest things they receive heavy floggings, are shackled, and put in the stocks, and treated with so much cruelty that they are kept whole days without a drink of water" (Bancroft 1886-1890, 1:593). The unfortunate padre was quickly isolated, declared insane, and taken under armed guard out of California. Tales of this clerical "reign of terror" within the missions rapidly spread to unconverted tribes. As a result it is not surprising that as early as 1787 the missionaries began to use the military to "recruit" reluctant tribes for conversion (Cook

The ultimate purpose of the mission institution can be described best as Indian control. Lesser motives included economic support for military establishments, forced assimilation of the Indian into Hispanic society (see "Basketry," fig. 7d, this vol.), and conversion to Spanish Catholicism (fig. 3). Finally, let there be no doubt that the mission was much more than a merely religious institution. On the contrary, it served as a primary instrument of conquest for the sole benefit of the Spanish Crown (Ricard 1966:15-38).

The other major institution of Spanish colonization was the presidio. These military forts had been established at San Diego, Santa Barbara, Monterey, and San Francisco by 1800. In addition there were lesser numbers of soldiers stationed at other missions. However, military control was not the sole purpose of the presidio. These places also served as areas where native labor was exploited and Indian women were forced to entertain 102 Spanish soldiers. The presidios, like the missions and



Fig. 3. Catholic padre's hat made by Chumash Indians with native basketry technique. Collected by George Vancouver at Santa Barbara, 1792-1793. Diameter about 40 cm.

most other buildings in colonial California, were built with free native labor provided by the neophytes and prisoners. As soldiers' families began to acquire Indian servants this ultimately fostered the development of a gente de razón ruling class of Hispanos served by a mass of native laborers.

From the native viewpoint the Spanish invasion and occupation was a catastrophe of indescribable proportions. The coastal native population was rapidly reduced due to disease and sickness introduced by concentration in unhealthy mission environments (Cook 1940:35-48). Missionization imposed on neophytes a physical and social environment far different from their aboriginal village life. The mission housing aggregated many people in a relatively small area with bad sanitation and minimal ventilation and heat, providing a favorable environment for the spread of contagious diseases. Christianization meant for many inland tribes relocation from warm interior weather to the cool damp coastal region. Indians in California, like Indians throughout the Americas, were highly susceptible to most European diseases; and contact between the two races almost inevitably resulted in a high native death rate. Hispanos first infected the neophytes with venereal disease, which quickly spread to nonmission tribes as early as 1800 and thereafter increased steadily. Although it has not been proved conclusively that venereal disease decreases fertility, it certainly weakened individuals and made them more susceptible to all diseases. Three major epidemics occurred during the Spanish occupation. The first was reported at Mission Santa Clara in 1777 and was said to have been respiratory in nature. In 1802 a pneumonia and diphtheria epidemic, almost entirely confined to the young, ravaged the natives from Mission San Carlos to San Luis Obispo. The most devastating malady of this era occurred in 1806 when a measles epidemic decimated native peoples from San Francisco to Santa Barbara. In this catastrophe at least 1,600 natives died and

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in some missions it was reported that children under 10 years of age were almost completely wiped out. In all, modern research has determined that about 45 percent of the population decline during Spanish occupation was the direct result of introduced diseases and sickness (Cook 1943:13-22).

In addition to disease the rapid decline of Indian population under mission influence can be attributed to changes in diet and inadequate nutrition. It is doubtful that food provided in the missions was adequate. Accustomed to a rich and varied aboriginal diet of acorn, wild seeds, small game, and fish, the neophytes' diet was confined to a daily ration of a highly starchy cereal soup called atole, sometimes with a little meat. The monotonous diet had the overall effect of lowering resistance to other diseases, causing deficiency conditions such as avitaminosis, and finally causing partial or complete starva-

In response to the invasion of the territory, California Indians almost at once began to offer all forms of resistance to the new order. Due to their various tribal social orders and political independence native resistance usually occurred in a haphazard and piecemeal fashion. Nevertheless, two types of native resistance resulted from this situation: the first was active or violent resistance and the second was passive.

One of the earliest and most successful demonstrations of native resistance to colonization was the destruction of Mission San Diego on November 4, 1775. Under the leadership of the neophyte Francisco of the Cuiamac Rancheria, the Ipai-Tipai organized nine villages into a force of about 800 men who not only completely destroyed the mission but also killed three Hispanos including Padre Jaume. That these normally independent villages could unite in common rebellion bears testimony to the recognition of the threat the invaders presented. Questioned after the rebellion, one Indian leader declared that he wanted to kill the priests and soldiers "in order to live as they did before" (Cook 1943:66). These Indians were not pacified until late 1776.

Other less spectacular resistance occurred in the San Francisco Bay area beginning about 1793. In February of that year a runaway neophyte named Charquin began a struggle against the Spanish. The Saklan and Chuchillones (Costanoan tribelets) of the northeast bay area soon began to resist parties recruiting converts and looking for runaway neophytes. After some three years of sporadic warfare, they were finally subdued by the Spanish military (Bancroft 1886-1890, 1:547-549). Some resistance was also noted among the Costanoan Indians against Mission San Jose in 1800.

There were many unsuccessful revolts. The Gabrielino under the leadership of a medicine woman named Toypurina were thwarted in an attempt to destroy Mission San Gabriel in 1785-1786. The Indians from Missions La Purísima and San Luis Obispo together plotted a revolt that was discovered by the missionaries and resulted in several arrests. Sporadic resistance also occurred between 1790 and 1800 at Missions Santa Clara and San Juan Bautista (Bancroft 1886-1890, 1:547).

In addition to violent group resistance, individual neophytes occasionally attempted to murder the Franciscan priests. In 1801 a number of priests were reportedly poisoned at Missions San Miguel and San Antonio. Eleven years later neophytes from Santa Cruz killed Father Quintana so cleverly that the murder was not discovered for two years (Asisara 1877:1-15).

Perhaps the most spectacular Indian rebellion in California during this era was the 1824 revolt at Missions La Purísima and Santa Barbara (Bancroft 1886-1890, 2:527-537). The reason for the revolt was ill treatment and forced labor imposed by the soldiers and priests upon neophytes in the area, but the immediate cause was a fight that broke out at the flogging of a La Purísima neophyte at Santa Ynez in February. Apparently no one was killed but a large part of the mission buildings was destroyed by fire. That same afternoon as many as 2,000 Indians attacked and captured Mission La Purísima. Soon they were bolstered by reinforcements from Santa Ynez and San Fernando. They immediately began preparations for defense by erecting palisades, mounting cannons and swivel guns, and cutting gun ports in the walls of the church and other buildings. Meanwhile the news of the uprising at La Purísima and Santa Ynez reached Santa Barbara. Upon its receipt the neophytes armed themselves and began to remind themselves of the ill treatment they had received from the soldiers. After some futile negotiation with the priests, the neophytes were attacked by the soldiers. A battle of several hours ensued throughout the mission; finally the soldiers withdrew to the presidio. The neophytes then sacked the mission and retreated to the back country. Indian losses were reported at two killed and three wounded, while the soldiers suffered four wounded. A month passed during which the Spanish authorities were able neither to persuade the Santa Barbara Indians to return nor to recapture La Purisima Mission. It was not until March 16 that the Spanish soldiers attacked the 400 defenders at La Purisima with hundreds of armed and mounted men and four-pounder guns. The neophytes answered with a volley of musket and cannon fire and a shower of arrows. The battle raged all morning until a ceasefire was negotiated with the aid of the padres. The Spanish suffered five killed and numerous wounded, while the Indians reported 16 killed and a large number wounded. During the early part of April Spanish soldiers pursued the Santa Barbara neophytes to the plain of the Tulares where after two skirmishes the soldiers retreated to Santa Barbara. Reports then began to reach Santa Barbara that many neophytes from San Fernando had run away to join the Indians from Santa Barbara and that neophytes at San Buenaventura and San Gabriel were 103

1943:73-80).

showing alarming signs of revolt. At the end of May Spanish soldiers marched to the Tulares, negotiated a truce with the rebel neophytes, and allowed them to return to the mission with their arms. Despite these concessions as many as 400 refused to return. In the latter part of July a criminal prosecution was carried out against the La Purísima rebels that resulted in the execution of seven neophytes. Four leaders of the revolt-Mariano, Pacomio, Benito, and Bernarde-were sentenced to 10 years of chain-gang labor; Benito and Bernarde eventually escaped (Stickel and Cooper 1969).

Although violent opposition occurred sporadically throughout this period nonviolent or passive resistance was by far the most significant and widespread form of native resistance. The most obvious form of nonviolent resistance was escape from the missions into the interior. Reports of fugitivism from the missions occurred in each mission for every year until secularization. Usually Indians ran away from the missions in small groups or individually; however, in 1795 over 200 Costanoan Indians abandoned Mission Dolores in a mass escape to freedom. In most cases the escaped neophytes later turned to active resistance to insure their freedom. One observer noted:

Indians of course deserted. Who would not have deserted? Still, those who did had hard times of it. If they proceeded to other missions, they were picked up immediately, flogged and put in irons until an opportunity presented of returning them to undergo other flaggellations. . . . the only alternative left them was to take to the mountains, where they lived as they best could, making occasional inroads on the Mission property to maintain themselves (Heizer 1968:80).

The runaway neophytes also introduced Spanish horses, weapons, and military tactics to the unconverted interior tribes and convinced them to stiffen their own efforts at resistance to missionization (Holterman 1970:43-45).

Another devastating result of missionization was the state of psychological depression that inevitably seized long-term neophytes. It is indeed depressing to find repeated reports of this phenomenon throughout the mission system. One sympathetic observer noted, "At first, surprise and astonishment filled their minds; a strange lethargy and inaction predominated afterwards" (Heizer 1968:76).

Another widespread form of nonviolent resistance was the practice of abortion to prevent births in the missions. In addition, infanticide was practiced upon children born out of the forced concubinage of Indian women by priests and soldiers. A contemporary at mission San Gabriel wrote that "they necessarily became accustomed to these things, but their disgust and abhorrence never left them till many years after. In fact every white child born among them for a long period was secretly strangled and 104 buried" (Heizer 1968:70).

Although the padres had attempted to eliminate all persons having any native spiritual authority, nearly all neophytes continued to practice some form of their traditional native religion within the missions (Cook 1943:145-153). This form of resistance is known to have occurred on a large scale in the Santa Barbara area around 1801 (Heizer 1941a). After a very destructive epidemic in the area a neophyte received a vision telling him that all the converts must recommit themselves to their own god if they hoped to survive. It appears that all the Chumash of the area were involved without the knowledge of the local Hispanos. In fact the movement was still reported as active 10 years later. During the latter years of the mission era a priest who compared California tribesmen to a species of monkeys corroborated the persistence of native faith at Mission San Juan Capistrano: "Superstitions of a ridiculous and most extravagant nature were found associated with these Indians, and even now in almost every town or hamlet the child is first taught to believe in their authenticity" (Boscana 1933:61). After a careful examination of all mission reports on this subject Cook (1943:147) concluded that "no competent contemporary authority . . . vouchsafed the unqualified assertion that the neophytes had to a significant degree given up their primitive customs and superstitions." This situation remained the same until the end of the mission system in California.

The Mexican Period

The years 1821 through 1823 marked the transition of California from a distant outpost of a dying empire to a marginal province of a much-troubled Mexican republic (Hutchinson 1965). Mexico inherited from Spain a vast and overextended colonial empire embracing much of the southwestern portion of the North American continent. Alta California at this time, as it was throughout the Mexican period, remained at the far fringes of the empire, isolated and sparsely populated by Hispanos. As in the Spanish period, Mexicans could claim control over only a narrow coastal strip of territory, occupied by its inherited institutions of colonialism-the missions, the military presidio, and the civilian pueblos. Although nearly all the interior continued under the control of its native people throughout the Mexican period, the impact of the coastal occupation was phenomenal.

The status of the Indian in the eyes of the Hispanos was that of a minor. The Mexican attitude toward the Indians was essentially the same as that of the Spanish. Neither Spain nor Mexico acknowledged Indian ownership of the land, but simply a right of occupancy. Indeed the entire policy and practice in regard to the natives was fraught with inconsistencies. Despite the adoption of the Plan of Iguala by the Mexican government in 1821, an act that guaranteed citizenship to Indians and protection of their person and property, Indian neo-

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phytes and gentiles alike were seized for forced labor and their property confiscated. Indeed, up to 1836 the mission fathers continued to "recruit" Indian converts with military campaigns to bolster the diminishing labor force in the missions. These later military campaigns tended to concentrate on territories east of the coastal missions on lands recently "acquired" by Mexican colonists in land grants from the Mexican government (Cook

Lacking the cultural and religious fanaticism of the Spanish occupation, the Mexican government soon bowed to the ascending middle-class interests throughout Mexico and in a series of acts brought about formal secularization of the missions from 1834 to 1836. However, instead of dividing the land and property between the surviving mission Indians and clerical authorities, as was originally intended, secular authorities appropriated most of the mission wealth for themselves and their relatives. The price of missionization had indeed been high: only 15,000 neophytes survived conversion of a total of 53,600 baptized between 1769 and 1836 (Bowman 1958). The sacking of the mission resources, including livestock, tools, and building materials, signaled a turning point in California Indian history.

The entire economy of the Mexican colony now shifted from the missions to the large landed estates of wealthy Mexicans. At the end of the mission period, the Indians formerly under mission influence scattered. Some went into the civilian pueblo areas to seek work, others became laborers on the private ranchos, and many returned to the mountains to seek refuge in their aboriginal homeland.

Those who went to the pueblos to seek work found only a life of poverty and debauchery. Sad indeed was the plight of the former missionized Indians who had nowhere else to turn since their original homeland had begun to fill with foreigners. An exneophyte from Mission Dolores made these observations:

I am very old . . . my people were once around me like the sands of the shore . . . many . . . many. They have all passed away. They have died like the grass . . . they have gone to the mountains. I do not complain, the antelope falls with the arrow. I had a son. I loved him. When the palefaces came he went away. I do not know where he is. I am a Christian Indian, I am all that is left of my people. I am alone (Johnston 1958).

Those who remained at or near the White settlements could find subsistence only as domestics and were ruthlessly exploited by their employers. In fact many who employed Indians would pay them only with alcohol, thus further contributing to their destruction. Life in the settlements led to an almost immediate breakdown of tribal organization and loss of cultural identity for the

Indians who came under the influence of wealthy Mexican land barons found little improvement in their lot over earlier mission labor systems. The haciendapeon society was transplanted intact from Mexico to California. This peonage system was rapidly developed by the rancheros and maintained by methods ranging from economic persuasion to outright slavery. By 1840 there were some dozen of these feudal establishments, each with 20 to several hundred Indians, in all perhaps as many as 4,000. In northern California many Pomo, Wappo, Patwin, Maidu, Plains Miwok, and Central Valley Yokuts came up against this type of economic exploitation. In the southern part of the state the Luiseño, Cupeño, and Serrano experienced dislocations and exploitation from Mexican colonists while the Gabrielino and Chumash began to experience the last stages of ex-

In the interior of California, the situation was characterized by widespread intermittent warfare between non-Christianized tribes and Mexican colonists. During the years 1830 to 1846 the interior native population suffered more extensively from brutality and violence than might perhaps be anticipated. Violence was a critical factor among tribes that resisted more stubbornly, especially the Sierra Miwok and Wappo. The Mexican military responded to the demands of the expanding rancho economy for new laborers by initiating a new style of warfare. There was a change from the Spanish tactic of large, organized campaigns to frequent small private actions for the purpose of wreaking reprisal or seizing slaves (Cook 1943a:5). One such filibustering expedition led by Jose Maria Amador in 1837 was characteristic of the barbarity and inhuman treatment accorded central valley Indians by Mexican colonists during this period. According to Amador his party

invited the wild Indians and their Christian companions to come and have a feast of pinole and dried meat. They all came over to our side of the river. As soon as they reached our shore the troops, the civilians and the auxiliaries surrounded them and tied them all up . . . we separated 100 Christians. At every half mile or mile we put six of them on their knees to say their prayers, making them understand that they were about to die. Each one was shot with four arrows, two in front and two in the back. Those who refused to die immediately were killed with spears. . . . On the road were killed in this manner the 100 Christians. . . . The Ensign told me to do what ever I thought best (with the others). I answered that I thought all the prisoners should be shot, having previously made Christians of them. They should be told they were going to die and they should be asked if they wanted to be made Christians. I ordered Nazario Galindo to take a bottle of water and I took another. He began at one part of the crowd of captives and I at another. We baptized all the Indians and afterwards they were shot in the back. At the first volley 70 fell dead. I doubled the charge for the 30 who remained and they all fell (Cook 1962:197-198). 105 Moreover, native resisters could no longer look to the church for pardons such as the earlier resistance leaders Francisco and Toypurina had received.

In response to the expansion of settlement into the Sacramento valley and these new military excursions, native resistance began to stiffen. Adopting guerilla warfare tactics perfected earlier by native resistance leaders like Estanislao, tribesmen underwent considerable physical and military adaptation. With the acquisition of horses from the colonists, these Indians changed from peaceful, sedentary, localized groups to semiwarlike, seminomadic groups. They began to take the offensive, making widespread cattle raids to supplement their diminishing native food supply. Typical of this new resistance were the exploits of Yozcolo, a former Laquisamne (Plains Miwok) neophyte at Mission Santa Clara. Credited with many stock raids throughout the 1830s he and his followers eluded Mexican officials for many years. Then, after a raid on the Rancho del Encino Coposo in 1839, which resulted in the death of two Hispanos, he and about 100 of his followers were captured near Los Gatos after an all-day battle. Wounded, Yozcolo was forced to fight a hand-to-hand battle with a soldier who killed him, cut off his head and rode triumphantly back to Santa Clara (Holterman 1970a).

Well-known colonists such as Gen. Mariano Guadalupe Vallejo became wealthy and powerful after military campaigns against native people. In 1834 Vallejo attacked and killed over 200 Satiyomi (Wappo) tribesmen and captured 300 others (Cook 1943a:9). Instead of declining, the violence and brutality increased. In fact as the later years of the Mexican occupation progressed, the colonial government's ability to cope with stock raiding deteriorated. Evidence of this situation is reflected in the Mexican assembly's resolutions of 1846 to devote surplus revenues to "active efforts" against Indians. If the surplus did not suffice, civil employees were to be called upon for part of their salaries. In addition, it was resolved that a military border police be established and a fortification be built at Pacheco Pass to prevent further raids (Bancroft 1886-1890, 5:566-567). In the central valley the Indian offensive reached a peak in 1845 and then rapidly decreased due to rear attacks suffered from American colonists filling the valley. In the south from 1841 to 1848 warfare became much more intensified. Due to internal power struggles after 1841, the situation became so confused and the power of the Mexican administration so weak that even nominal control over the military activity of its citizens was lost. Although no estimates are available for the southern part of the state, it has been estimated that military casualties accounted for about 6 percent of the population decline, a critical demographic element in the cases of specific tribes.

Even more devastating than military incursion were the White man's diseases. Venereal disease continued to 106 be reported widespread, as the general health conditions

among natives continued to deteriorate. Other maladies followed: measles, pneumonia, diphtheria, and other respiratory diseases ravaged missionized tribes in a series of major epidemics until 1827. In 1833 smallpox first appeared to an alarming extent, along with scarlet fever, cholera, and tuberculosis. In the same year the Wintun, Maidu, Miwok, and Yokuts suffered an unknown disease called the "Pandemic of 1833" in which as many as 4,500 Indians died—a total loss of about 10 percent for all tribes involved. A smallpox epidemic struck the Pomo, Wappo, and Wintun five years later, killing more than 2,000 before it was spent. In 1844 smallpox attacked the Miwok. A new epidemic of "fever" ravaged the Wintun two years later. Finally a more virulent strain of smallpox devastated the Pomos of Clear Lake in 1850. Overall losses for northern California are estimated at 11,500 between 1830 and 1848. Disease accounted for a net population decrease of up to 60 percent-five times greater than homicide. By the end of the Mexican occupation the total native population had been reduced to about 100,000 persons (Cook 1943a:16-20).

When the Mexican War came to California, some well-known Indians were recruited by the Mexicans for defense purposes. Bancroft (1886-1890, 5) reports the organization of a company of California Indians (probably Gabrielino) in Los Angeles and another to serve New Helvetia, under John A. Sutter. In John C. Frémont's battalion, Company H consisted of 40 Tulare Indians whose duty it was to raid Mexican ranchos of cattle and horses for the Americans. Generally known as the "40 thieves," these Indians proved to be very accomplished at their task; for years after the war they continued their raids on horses and cattle for their own people. There seems to be no evidence that any of these Indian groups participated in any battles of the war to a significant degree.

There was one incident during the Mexican War that illustrated the tragic consequences of the loss of racial unity suffered by native people. In this incident a group of Luiseño under Manuelito Cota and Pablo Apis was suspected of killing 11 Hispanos at Agua Caliente on J.J. Warner's rancho. It appears that this occurred a few days after the battle of San Pascual in December 1845. The Mexicans regarded the incident as an Indian rebellion, since the Luiseño at Mission San Luis Rey had abandoned the mission en masse at about the same time. Gen. Jose Maria Flores ordered Jose del Carmen Lugo to punish the Indians. Lugo recruited the aid of the Cahuilla Chief Juan Antonio and his followers, and joined by forces from Mission San Luis Rey he marched on the Luiseño rancheria at Temecula in February 1847. Drawn into an ambush, the poorly armed Luiseños were slaughtered in a crossfire. Although Cota escaped, his losses are reported at 33 to 100 killed. This tragic episode had the dubious distinction of being the bloodiest


battle of the Mexican War in California (Parker 1971:7). Indeed, more lives were lost in this one engagement than the total of all casualties of the Mexican War in the entire state. Indians in California committed the tragic error of all Indians, in allying themselves against their own people.

The American Period

In February 1848 the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ceded sovereignty over Alta California, New Mexico, and Arizona to the United States. A new colonial order soon seized power in California, with disastrous results for the native people. Until 1845 the Hispano population in California numbered only a few thousand persons, mostly concentrated along the coast. In contrast, Anglo hegemony was characterized by the introduction of colonists seeking land and intense exploitation of natural resources. Spanish and Mexican colonial government had attempted to incorporate the Indian into its economic and social order, but the Anglo-American system had no place for the Indian except to the extent that he performed as a White man (Cook 1943b). Thus Indian life, which was more valuable to the Mexicans because they institutionalized Indian labor for wealth, was seen as worthless to the Americans. Further, Mexican custom sanctioned miscegenation for lower classes, while Anglos were appalled by it.

Given the attitude of the new invaders, it is not surprising that war between native people and the Anglos commenced almost at once. Anglo invaders began to seize land in the interior valley and along the northern coast. Yuki, Cahto, Yurok, and Tolowa tribesmen suffered greatly from these incursions. The number of Whites soon increased rapidly with the arrival of hordes of lawless adventurers seeking quick wealth in 1849. During these early years action against the native consisted of widespread and small personal combats between individuals and little groups. In a letter to the commissioner of Indian affairs, Agent Adam Johnson reported on the character of "Indian wars" in California:

The majority of tribes are kept in constant fear on account of the indiscriminate and inhuman massacre of their people for real or supposed injuries. They have become alarmed of the increased flood of immigration much spread over their country....it was just incomprehensible to them.... I have seldom heard of a single difficulty between the whites and the Indians in which the original cause could not readily be traced to some rash or reckless act of the former. In some instances it has happened that innocent Indians have been shot down for imaginary offenses which did not in fact exist. . . . when cattle were missing it was quickly supposed that they had been stolen by the Indians and the lives of several were paid. Again where a man was absent a few days longer than expected his death was imagined and the lives of several paid the penalty for the supposed murder (Johnston 1958a).



Lib. of Congress: Browne 1864:305. Fig. 4. "Protecting the Settlers." This sarcastically titled 1864 engraving depicts the fate of the Indians of Nome Cult Valley during the winter of 1858-1859. Considered "only Diggers" (Heizer 1974), California Indians could be attacked without fear of government

The Clear Lake Massacre illustrates the character of some larger military operations against natives at this time. The trouble began over the killing of two White men by the Pomos in 1849. These two men had brutally exploited the Indians at Clear Lake by enslaving and abusing them, and many died as a result. The military answered the killing of the White men with a campaign in 1850 under Capt. Nathanial Lyon. Equipped with boats, the soldiers

went across [the lake] in their long dug-outs, the indians said they would meet them in peace. So when the whites landed the indians went to wellcom them but the white man was determined to kill them. Ge-Wi-Lih said he threw up his hands and said no harm me good man but the white man fired and shoot him in the arm . . . many women and children were killed around this island. One old lady . . . saw two white men coming with their guns up in the air and on their guns hung a little girl, they brought it to the creek and threw it in the water . . . two more men came . . . this time they had a little boy on the end of their guns and also threw it in the water. alittle ways from her . . . two white men stabbed the woman and the baby ... all the little ones were killed by being stabbed, and many of the women were also. This old lady also told about the whites hung aman on Emerson's Island The Indian was hung and alarge fire built under [him] another . . . was tied to atree and burnt to death (Benson 1932:271-272).

The army reported 60 out of 400 Indians were killed on the island, while another 75 were murdered on the Russian River nearby. That this was without a doubt a massacre is substantiated by the reports of only 2 wounded Whites and over 135 natives killed.

Many expeditions against the Indians were the result of local conspiracies to gain Indian property and political capital for ambitious office seekers. Special Government Investigator J. Ross Browne provides this description of a typical militia expedition against Humboldt Indians:

During the winter of last year a number of them [Indians] were gathered at Humboldt. The whites thought it was a favorable opportunity to get rid of them altogether. So they went in a body to the Indian camp, during the night when the poor wretches were asleep, shot all the men, women, and children at the first onslaught, and cut the throats of the remainder. Very few escaped. Next morning 60 bodies lay weltering in their blood—the old and the young, male and female—with every wound gaping a tale of horror to the civilized world. Children climbed upon their mothers' breasts and sought nourishment from the fountains that death had drained; girls and boys lay here and there with their throats cut from ear to ear; men and women, clinging to each other in their terror, were found perforated with bullets or cut to pieces with knives—all were cruelly murdered (Browne 1944:62).

The state and federal government subsidized these conspiracies by reimbursing these "private military forays" for expenses incurred. Almost any White man could raise a volunteer company, outfit it with guns, ammunition, horses, and supplies, and be reasonably sure that the state government would honor its vouchers. The state legislature passed acts in 1851 and 1852 authorizing payment of over \$1,100,000 for suppression of Indian hostilities. Again in 1857 the legislature issued bonds amounting to \$410,000 for the same purpose. Congress eventually reimbursed the state for nearly all the bonds issued, indeed a dreary story of subsidized murder (12 Stat. 199-200).

Up to 1860 overall loss of life due to military homicide accounted for at least 4,267 deaths, or about a 12 percent reduction of population (Cook 1943b:5-9). Military casualties reached their peak from 1854 to 1857. None of these so-called Indian wars in the California valley was more than an attempt at wholesale slaughter of native people (Bancroft 1886-1890, 7:477).

After 1848 Indians in California began to experience the threatened destruction of their native economy for the first time. The Indians had a precisely balanced relationship with their food supply. Soon after the arrival of the Americans serious depletions of that supply began to occur: mining operations adversely affected salmon fishing and destroyed fish dams (Cook 1943b:27-46). The Anglos' total disregard for the destruction of the natural 108 environment in their frenzy to exploit the land struck a mortal blow to the Indians' sacred relationship with nature. Extensive agriculture prevented communal hunts for rabbit and deer. The Whites' fences prevented women from gaining access to oak groves for acorn gathering. At the same time, cattle and hogs ate huge supplies of grasses and acorns, seriously depleting the seed supply. Another factor that helped destroy native food supplies was the destruction of stored foods during the "Indian wars." The overall impact of this destruction of the food supply can be characterized by a lowering of resistance to disease, especially among the young and older people. Prolonged undernutrition contributed to mental lassitude and infant mortality because of mothers' inability to withstand childbirth and decreases in milk. This depletion of the aboriginal food supply in part also explains the increase in stock raiding among California tribes.

Shortly after the Mexican War, Anglos introduced new labor conditions upon the Indians that proved even more disastrous than during the Mexican era. As the native economy began to break down, more and more Indians were forced to attempt to accommodate themselves to new modes of making a living. However, Indians had a difficult time understanding the work ethic of the new order. They were at a disadvantage because of their unfamiliarity with the economy and because of differing cultural values, which, for example, stressed conflicting time concepts. There was also a general decline in the demand for labor as the huge ranchos began to break up, ending forever the pastoral peonage society and its economy. The end of the gold rush soon flooded the labor market with Whites, leaving only domestic work and subsistence labor available to the Indian.

In 1850 the legislature passed a law that seriously affected the Indians' labor position. This law declared that any Indian, on the word of a White man, could be declared a vagrant, thrown in jail, and have his labor sold at auction for up to four months with no pay. This indenture law further said any Indian adult or child with the consent of his parents could be legally bound over to a White citizen for a period of years, laboring for subsistence only. These laws marked the transition of the Indian from peonage to virtual slavery; they gave free vent to the exploitative ethos of Americans who soon took advantage of the situation (Heizer and Almquist 1971:39-58). Nearby Indians were rounded up, made to labor, and turned out to starve and die when the work season was over. Correspondence to the superintendent of Indian affairs in January 1853 described one such

I went over to the San Pablo rancho, in Contra Costa county, to investigate the matter of alleged cruel treatment of Indians there. I found seventy-eight on this rancho, and twelve back of Martinez, and they were there most of them sick, all without clothes, or any food but the fruit of the buckeye. Up to the time of my coming, eighteen had died of starvation at one

camp: how many at the other I could not learn. These present Indians are the survivors of a band who were worked all last summer and fall, and as the winter set in, when broken down by hunger and labor, without food or clothes, they were turned adrift to shift for themselves (U.S. Congress. Senate 1853:9).

The labor laws in California also fostered the institutionalization of kidnapping of Indian children. Evidence indicates that this practice was widespread throughout California. An editorial in the Marysville Appeal of December 6, 1861, revealed:

But it is from these mountain tribes that white settlers draw their supplies of kidnapped children, educated as servants, and women for purposes of labor and lust. . . . It is notorious that there are parties in the northern counties of this state, whose sole occupation has been to steal young children and squaws from the poor Diggers . . . and dispose of them at handsome prices to the settlers, who, being in the majority of cases unmarried but . . . willingly pay 50 or 60 dollars for a young digger to cook and wait upon them, or 100 dollars for a likely young girl (Cook 1943b:58).

These crimes against humanity so enraged the Indians in that area that they began to retaliate by killing the Whites' livestock. At once an order from the army headquarters was issued to chastise the "guilty." Under this indefinite order a company of U.S. troops, accompanied by a large volunteer force, pursued the Indians persistently. The kidnappers followed at the heels of the soldiers to seize the children after their parents had been

The practice of legalized kidnapping and seizure of Indian children and young girls lasted for 15 years until 1867, when in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, it was stricken from state law. Well over 4,000 Indians had been victims of this most cruel form of slavery.

During the American period, diseases and epidemics did not occur in large outbreaks among the Indians; however, disease attacked the Indians in chronic form or by small local outbreaks. This had the effect of exacting a steady toll of lives over a long period of time. The most common diseases remained tuberculosis, smallpox, pneumonia, measles, and venereal diseases. In fact intensification of infections nearly increased with the coming of the Anglos. There was at this time a general syphilis infection of approximately 20 percent, while gonorrhea was reported to be 100 percent. Such an onslaught of infection seriously damaged the physical stamina and moral fiber of the native people. Some tribes suffered up to 90 percent population decrease due to infection of these diseases. Similar to the earlier Mexican period, disease constituted the greatest single factor in the population decrease. Cook (1943b:24) estimates for this period a 65 percent decrease in population due solely to diseases.

Administration by Agents

Official relations between the Indians of California and the United States government were initiated by the military governor, Gen. S.W. Kearney, in April 1847. He appointed three Indian agents for northern, southern, and central California. Their duties were to deal chiefly in "good advice," explain changes in colonial governments, and make promises or threats to keep the Indians pacified. During these early years the agents did little and no official policy was established. Between 1851 and 1852 three treaty commissioners negotiated 18 treaties with random groups of California natives, promising over 7 million acres of reservation land in exchange for the entire state (Heizer 1972). These treaties enraged Whites, who bombarded Congress with an abusive campaign that resulted in their rejection.

The creation of the state government at this time introduced yet another unfavorable factor into the situation that confronted the Indians. This government inevitably reflected the frontiersman's contempt for and impatience with any policy that looked toward the solution of the Indian problem on a basis of fairness toward the Indian or any idea that the Indian could have any rights that a White man was bound to respect. In his 1851 message to the legislature Gov. John McDougall outlined the state's genocidal aim with "Jacksonian logic": "That a war of extermination will continue to be waged between the races until the Indian race becomes extinct, must be expected. . . . the inevitable destiny of the race is beyond the power or wisdom of man to avert" (California. Legislature. Senate and Assembly 1851:1). Further, the rejection of the 18 treaties and the adoption of the state's labor laws seem to have put the status of the Indian outside of federal control and quickly led to conflicts between state and federal authorities. This conflict allowed the development of the state militia's punitive expeditions, which proved to be so devastating to native people. In fact throughout this period many times U.S. troops were not even contacted for aid. The militia hoped to make financial and political capital by handling the situation themselves. The so-called Mariposa War of 1851 is a good example of this situation (Bunnell 1911). The Mariposa tribes, reacting to dispossession and exploitation by White miners and squatters, began stock raiding, which resulted in the organization of a local militia. When the militia failed to defeat the tribesmen, Indian Subagent Adam Johnson and trader James D. Savage went not to the United States military commander of the Pacific stationed at Benicia but to the governor at San Jose to seek aid. Both Johnson and Savage claimed to the governor that little help could be expected from the federal government, although it was later shown that they did not even try to contact the U.S. military headquarters authorities at Benicia until after their journey to San Jose. Naturally Savage was 109 bound to profit heavily by a state campaign there since he owned the only trading post in the area.

Indeed one unnecessary and tragic consequence of the confusion of authority among federal, state, and local governments in regard to Indian policy resulted in the Garra uprising of 1851. The revolt occurred among the Cahuilla, Quechan, and Cocopa tribes and centered in the Cupeño village of Agua Caliente in a mountainous region of central San Diego County. The immediate cause of the outbreak was a state tax imposed upon the property of these Indians in 1850. The next year Antonio Garra, Sr., an exneophyte from Mission San Luis Rey, organized several Indian villages near Thermal Springs to refuse to pay the tax after the head of the state militia advised Garra that Indians could not be taxed. In response to the continued insistence on the part of the local authorities for the tax, Garra attempted to bring together a broad confederacy of southern California Indians to expel the Whites from their territory. The Cocopa and Quechan Indians first responded by attacking and killing two Anglos and two Mexicans and confiscating their stock. Shortly thereafter the Cupeño village at Agua Caliente rose up and attacked nearby Warner's ranch, destroying the house and store and killing four White men at Thermal Springs. The state militia with the regular army organized several attacks on Garra's Cupeño and Cahuilla strongholds, which resulted in the destruction of the Agua Caliente rancheria. Several prisoners were taken, and during the course of the outbreak five Indians and one White man were all tried by militia courts and executed. Garra was eventually captured by a rival Cahuilla captain and turned over to the Whites. He was tried by a paramilitary court, found guilty of murder, and shot January 10, 1852. Once Garra and his closest followers were captured and executed, the confederacy dissolved leaving the tax issue unresolved for some years (Loomis 1971:3-26).

In order to see that the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act was complied with in California, Congress appointed Edward F. Beale as new superintendent of Indian affairs. Beale arrived in California in the fall of 1852. One of his first acts as superintendent was to dismiss Treaty Commissioners Redick McKee and O. M. Wozencraft, who had not visited the Indians for over six months. He soon developed plans for the establishment of reservations in the state in conjunction with military posts. Early in 1853 Congress responded by authorizing the establishment of not more than five military reservations in California for \$250,000. The following September, Beale gathered together some 2,000 Indians to establish the Tejon Reservation of 50,000 acres of land near the extreme southern end in the San Joaquin valley. Here the Indians were given instructions in agriculture and provided with seeds and provisions until the first harvest. In concentrating all his efforts and energies 110 here, Beale seriously neglected the other 61,000 hungry

and pursued natives throughout the state. In defense of his one-reservation policy, Beale declared that "humanity must yield to necessity, they are not dangerous, therefore they must be neglected" (U.S. Congress. Senate. Documents 1853). In the summer of 1854 he was removed from office. He was charged with failure to keep proper financial records and insinuations were made that he had been guilty of peculations.

It would appear that the dismissal of Beale was a small indication of massive corruption. In 1853 Treaty Commissioner Wozencraft was charged with "irregularities" in his purchase and delivery of beef to starving Indians. Savage, a licensed trader to the Indians, was also charged with fraud. One of his employees testified: "My instructions from Savage were that . . . I was to take receipts for double the number actually delivered, and make no second delivery and to deliver one-third less than were receipted for. I also had orders to sell all beef I could to miners, which I did to the amount of about \$120.00 or \$130.00, and to deliver cattle to his clerks, to be sold to the Indians" (U.S. Congress. Senate 1853: 4-5). Many other irregularities resulted from corrupt management and neglect of the state's Indians by

In 1854 Beale was replaced by Col. T.J. Henley. The new superintendent authorized by Congress set about establishing reservations at Klamath River near the Oregon border, Nome Lackee on Stony Creek in Colusa, Nome Cult, Mendocino, Fresno Indian Farm, and Kings River Indian Farm. Despite Henley's establishment of these reservations it quickly became apparent that his administration of the Indian Service was even more corrupt than that of Beale. The large reservations established by Henley-Nome Lackee, Nome Cult, and Mendocino-suffered a lack of water and a scarcity of game. Many problems resulted from the fact that only Nome Lackee had been surveyed. In consequence an influx of White squatters began. Their cattle destroyed fenceless Indian fields and seriously depleted the acorn harvest. Most of these squatters were business partners or relatives of Henley and therefore impossible to remove. At Mendocino two White men owned a logging operation and a steam sawmill on the reservation, which seriously effected the salmon fishing. There was an unauthorized White-owned store there as well (ARCIA 1861:104).

Further evidence of Henley's incompetence and corruption derived from his employment of more persons than his instructions allowed and retention of employees who were confessed accomplices in various frauds. Henley and his agents kept few books or accounts of various purchases, and where kept they were incomplete or incomprehensible. He was also unable to account for the vast herds of cattle provided to the Indian Service for starving Indians. Henley's total disregard for Indian life can be illustrated by his failure to provide aid to belea-

guered Yokuts tribesmen who were victims of the "Tulare War of 1856" and also by charges by federal investigators that Indians on the reservations had been slaughtered in consequence of alleged depredations upon private property belonging to officers of the Indian Service. Finally the army charged Henley with turning reservations into almshouses where periodically goods were distributed to native people. Henley's policies destroyed the intention that the reservations should be permanent homes for the Indians. The army also charged Henley with providing only 2,000 or so Indians with homes while thousands of natives remained "trespassers on the public domain."

In April 1858 Special Treasury Agent J. Ross Browne forwarded charges of fraud and malfeasance against Henley. Yet he continued to act in his capacity as superintendent up to June 3, 1859, 14 months after the original charges were preferred and nearly a year after they were proved. In his reports Browne observed: "In the history of Indian races I have seen nothing so cruel and relentless as the treatment of these unhappy people by the authorities constituted by law for their protection. Instead of receiving aid and succor, they have been starved and driven away from the reservations, and then followed into their remote hiding places, where they sought to die in peace, and cruelly slaughtered, till but few are left, and that few without hope" (U.S. Congress. Senate 1860:13).

In response to the blatant corruption and mismanagement of Henley's administration, Congress passed the General Appropriation Act of February 1859, which in part called for a reorganization of Indian administration in California and a reduction of the Indian Services budget for California from \$162,000 a year to \$50,000. Obviously this did little to feed the starving Indians. It would not be unjust to say that the history of the government's relation with California Indians in these first 10 years of management was entirely corrupt. Subagents gerrymandered reservation boundaries to buy developed land, beef was seldom delivered to the Indians for whom it was intended, private businesses were allowed to operate on the reservation, books were incomplete and vouchers irregular. It is little wonder that few Indians ever stayed on the reservations. Native people found themselves again used as forced labor to enrich their overseers.

The beginning of the next decade witnessed the gradual disintegration of the colonial system first established by the United States upon the natives of California. This situation was the result of several factors. On the national level the Civil War created severe fiscal problems for the administration of the Indian Service in California. Within the state, disease continued to take a terrific toll of native life. The dwindling Indian population surrounded by a hostile frontier society with its indenture laws and the continued profiteering in the Indian Service all contributed to a wholesale abandonment of several reservations and the ultimate failure of the entire reservation system in the state (Dale 1949:42).

Government documents indicated a continuous decline in the Indian population throughout this period. There were several reasons for this situation. To be sure, disease and sickness continued to take a steady toll of lives. This problem was further complicated by the persistent reports of starvation and destitution among California tribes; however, the steady decrease was not due solely to starvation and illness. Hostilities continued to be a factor in the decrease of Indian residence on government reserves. The Konkow and Hat Creek (Atsugewi) tribes living with other tribes at Round Valley in 1862 were confronted by squatters encroaching on the reservation and told that since there was no food on the reservation they would be forced to steal or starve and that if they did not abandon the reservation the Whites would kill them all. The Indian agent apparently did little to aid the harassed natives. In August of that year 25 armed Whites came on the reservation and surrounded these Indians' camp and massacred about 45 of them. From Round Valley the 461 survivors of the Hat Creek and Konkow tribes fled to Chico. The next August those Indians were accused of killing two White boys. In response the Whites tied two Indians to a tree and scalped them and demanded that the Indians be either removed or exterminated. Meanwhile back at Round Valley, marshall law was declared because of trouble when the squatters on the reservation massacred more than 20 Wailaki men, women, and children there. Apparently the squatters then blamed the Indians for burning a barn containing 30 tons of hay. In retribution the army executed five Indians and in turn two-thirds of the Indian crop was destroyed by the squatters. The presence of the army, instead of providing security for the reservation, simply further agitated the natives by the soldiers' seizing Indian women and introducing an epidemic of venereal diseases. Finally in 1863 the Hat Creek and Konkow tribes were returned to Round Valley. In a letter to the Indian Service, Army Capt. C.D. Douglas reported on the condition of these unfortunate natives: "I found all the Indians that were sent or brought on the reservation from Chico, about 10 days ago in an almost dying condition, through sickness and the gross neglect of duty of the present supervisor. I was also informed that nearly 200 sick Indians are scattered along all the way for forty miles, and that they are dying by tens for want of care and medical treatment and from lack of food" (ARCIA 1864:414). Although records are incomplete, there can be no

doubt that the total number of Indians under federal supervision decreased from approximately 3,000 to slightly over 1,000 for this time period. Eventually it became apparent that the California reservation system as envisioned by Beale and established by Henley was becoming a monumental failure. The state's indenture law 111 was used by nearby Whites to get the most able-bodied Indians from the reservation indentured to them for terms of 10 or 15 years. The problem of employees and former employees of the Indian Service contributing to the failure of the reservations continued, as can be traced in the annual reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. It was not uncommon to find a superintendent of Indian affairs leaving his post with debts up to \$35,000 unaccounted for, as Superintendent Charles Maltby did in 1867. The most serious problem was the ability of former high-placed officials of the Indian Service to gain control of lands surrounding and including portions of various reservations and Indian farms. By 1863 Beale had managed to acquire a 12,000-acre ranch adjacent to the Tejon Reserve. Now as a private rancher Beale openly expressed his desire to abolish the reservation. It is not difficult to imagine the demoralizing effect this had upon the Indians there. The man who claimed to be their friend a few years earlier was now demanding the dispossession of his former wards. At the Tule River Indian Farm established in 1861 near Visalia, the former agent, John P.H. Wentworth, managed to lease the entire farm to his enormous profit in 1863. Colonel Henley, the former superintendent, was the ruling spirit among the squatters encroaching upon the Round Valley Reservation (ARCIA 1864:129). In 1867 Special Government Agent Robert J. Stevens confirmed that Henley was originally responsible for inviting squatters into Round Valley Reservation and at the same time notifying Washington that the entire valley should be reserved for the Indians. Thus Henley set up the government by backing squatters' claims that the government should pay for their improvements and urging the government to buy out these interlopers. Henley also stood to profit heavily from this deal since he held extensive claims in the valley himself (ARCIA 1867:120). A further obstacle to the success of the early reservation system in California was the rapid and widespread turnover in the Indian Service personnel.

Perhaps the most persistent and decisive element contributing to the failure of the reservation system was the hostile frontier society that bordered on the government reserves. At Nome Lackee squatters held portions of the reservation including a mill and seized upon teams and farming implements belonging to the government. Claiming they acted under the sanction of Colonel Henley, they refused to surrender the government property. A sawmill at the mouth of the Noyo River reportedly destroyed salmon fishing upon which the Indians at the Mendocino Reserve relied as their staple food. Round Valley Reservation was literally overrun with White squatters who occupied about four-fifths of the reserva-

In addition to problems caused by the seizure of reservation land and property, the mere presence of Whites 112 on the reservation disrupted the Indian community. At

Round Valley the agent reported that "a large majority of the Whites were unmarried men who constantly excite the Indians to jealously and revenge by taking their squaws from them" (ARCIA 1861:148). Here also a government investigation revealed that corners of the Indian fences had been raised by chunks of wood to allow the squatters' hogs to feed on Indian fields. Cattle from the squatters' herds destroyed considerable portions of unfenced Indian fields at Nome Lackee and Tejon. In 1867 the government reported on the character and impact of White influence on the Indians.

[Squatters] evidently think an Indian has no rights that a white man is bound to respect; that all should be killed off except such as the settlers covet as men servants or maid servants. This class of settlers are continually creating disturbances amongst the Indians by selling or giving away liquor among them; by enticing women and children away from the reservation, and not unfrequently by boasting of the number of "buck" [Indians] they have killed, as if it were an achievement to be proud of. ... No man, however guilty, can be convicted of a misdemeanor for selling liquor to Indians . . . (ARCIA

Although the government apparently was aware of the many problems caused by the presence of Whites on the reservation no action was taken.

Given the adverse environment the Indians and reservations were forced to cope with, it is not surprising that the Indian Service bowed to the state's citizen pressures and began to abandon the reservations. As early as 1861 the government abandoned Fresno and Kings River Indian Farms, transferring the few remaining families to the new Tule River Indian Farm. In December of that year the Klamath River Reservation was abandoned after a destructive flood. In early 1863 the new superintendent in California found that at Nome Lackee the former agent had not paid the man in charge there who consequently sold all the movable property for back wages. The few remaining Indians scattered and the reservation was abandoned. Yielding to private interests Tejon Reserve was abandoned in 1864. Finally after eight years as a promising potential reservation Smith River Indian Farm north of Mendocino was abandoned in 1869 (Dale 1949).

Despite the vast expenditure of money and energy by the government to remove Indians to reservations the majority of California natives struggled to survive without any government aid whatsoever. This was the case of the Hupa tribe who persistently resisted White encroachment and efforts by the government to remove them. So successful was their resistance that in 1864, after five years of constant warfare, the Hupa tribe was guaranteed a reservation in the Hoopa Valley. In southern California the Indians were almost totally neglected. In May 1865 the Indian Service convened a meeting with southern tribal delegates at Temecula. Here the

government doled out a few agricultural implements and seed while hearing complaints from the Cahuilla who had been dispossessed of San Timoteo Canyon after fleeing from a smallpox epidemic there. Southern California tribesmen began to learn a difficult lesson about co-optation of native leadership when in 1865 the Indian Service reappointed Manuelito Cota over Chief Francisco to govern the Temecula Rancheria. The demoralizing effect of this official neglect of the nonreservation Indians was outlined by a federal report of 1866.

The Indians other than those before mentioned reside in various sections of the State, in small communities; in some localities their presence is obnoxious to the citizens; in others they are tolerated on account of the labor they perform for the whites; their condition is deplorable and pitiful in the extreme; they are demoralized both physically and morally. This condition, lamentable as it is, is the result of their intercourse and contact with the lowest class of the white population . . . The Indians in this superintendency are placed, by circumstances over which they had no control, under peculiar hardships . . . with no lands, no treaties, no annuities, no power or means of extricating themselves from the influences with which they are surrounded . . . (ARCIA 1866:94).

This situation was particularly true in southern California where no reservations or regular government aid were to be established for some years.

The "Quaker Policy"

A significant change in the administration of Indian affairs occurred shortly after President Grant took office. In an attempt to correct the national scandal of dishonest and incompetent Indian agents, the President initiated a new policy whose major aspect was the use of army officers and nominees of various religious denominations to govern Indian affairs throughout the country. Known as the "Quaker policy" for the denomination to which Grant first turned, Congress quickly terminated the use of army officers and thereafter relied on the churches (Tatum 1970). Under this system various territories and state superintendencies were distributed among different denominations. In California by far the majority of Indians who considered themselves Christians were Roman Catholic. Therefore with the typical forethought and sensitivity of a bureaucracy the California superintendency was "given" to the Episcopalians. Apparently the scandal civil-service employees had brought to the Indian Service was so embarassing that no one bothered to realize this new system constituted a union of church and state functions, which federal law prohibits. Ironically this policy enraged Catholic Church officials who had made no consistent effort to assist Christian Indians since the mission days. Archbishop José Sadoc Alemany of San Francisco testified to Indian Service officials that the Church could not do anything for the Indians while they remained under political control and might be reassigned to the administration of another denomination at any time. The Catholic Church would accept only a "permanent control" (Wetmore 1875:25). By 1871 the Episcopalians had established a regular ministry on Round Valley and Tule River reservations. Secular authorities were willing to allow California natives to practice many of their traditional religious ceremonies; the churches were not. Church administrators initiated a vigorous campaign to prohibit these practices and suppress the influence of anyone having native religious authority. This policy had the overall effect of creating and intensifying social and religious disorientation among California tribesmen. Details of this process can be found in the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (1869-1881).

About this same time a renaissance of native cultism resulted from the influence of the 1870 Ghost Dance originating from the Walker Lake Paiutes. The most consistent manifestation of this resurgence of native religion was the belief that the end of the world was near and that the dead would return with the disappearance of the Whites. By 1871 this cult had spread westward to the Washo, Modoc, Klamath, Shasta, and Karok tribes. Shortly thereafter it spread to the Yurok, then Achumawi, Northern Yana, Wintun, Hill Patwin, and finally Pomo peoples. Eventually the Ghost Dance spread as far south as the Southern San Joaquin valley (Gayton 1930a; Du Bois 1939). Although this religious revival developed into many forms, it was principally instrumental in reshaping native shamanism and probably helped native Californians withstand pressures to adopt Christianity. However, the overall impact of this movement had little significance on the history of the Indian in California. This period also witnessed the last outbreak of organized violent resistance among Indians of the state in the Modoc War of 1872-1873 (Dillon 1973).

The general condition of the Indians from 1850 to 1870 continued to deteriorate. Disease and chronic illness complicated by severe social, moral, and political disintegration created considerable hardships on the surviving natives. The upheaval and turmoil to which natives were constantly subjected loosened and tore asunder their social framework. Thousands of minor incidents and pressures contributed to the overall demoralizing effect. Indian people were seriously pauperized by repeated hostile incursions into their territory, almost always featuring the destruction of their stored foods and property. These incursions usually led to the abandonment of their villages, disruption of the native economy, and excessive hardships for the sick and starving. Captivity and removal of over 10,000 natives for labor and slavery through the California indenture act of 1850 also took a frightful toll. Forcibly uprooting more than one-fifth of the native population was bound to result in serious social upheaval—the disintegration of both family and community life (Cook 1943a:28).

The Indian population in the state continued to decline. Because of the establishment of the new southern California reservations, reservation Indian populations as a whole increased. However, at older reservations such as Hoopa, Round Valley, and Tule River, populations decreased from 30 to 50 percent due primarily to disenchantment with reservation management and continued sicknesses. Despite these disadvantages and hardships the majority of natives within the state struggled to survive by farming small subsistence gardens in addition to laboring off-reservation. Unfortunately, due to their unfamiliarity with the White economy and the controversy surrounding their legal status most Indians were not able to make subsistence farming and outside labor provide a steady economic base.

Although outside labor was generally available settlers universally took advantage of Indians in every way possible. Heavy manual farm labor constituted employment opportunities for both men and women. Gross fraud in the payment of wages was the most common form of labor exploitation. In many instances goods of one kind or another, generally of no account to them, were given in lieu of money so as to make the price of a day's labor to the employers not to exceed 10¢. It was not uncommon to dock laborers for imaginary neglect or fail to pay them altogether. Still other employers insisted on doling out Indian wages in cheap liquor, which further contributed to a lack of steady work habits that developed due to this rampant labor exploitation (Cook 1943b:46-75).

Outside labor, despite its disadvantages, became imperative as foreigners rapidly overran former native landholdings. While Indian agents and tribes on government reserves struggled to turn back encroaching squatters, nonreservation natives found their villages preempted by homesteaders or part of newly confirmed Spanish and Mexican land grants. Government agents in southern California reported in 1877 that Indians had already been driven from the best land and that their villages were threatened by White settlers who set up claims of a more or less valid character on almost every village site. Although most Indian tribes and individuals claimed their villages and surrounding territory by right of "immemorial possession," a few Indians even attempted to confirm their various claims through the court system. In 1879 two Luiseño Indians, Jose and Pablo Apis, attempted to have the District Court of California confirm their claim to a two-league grant to the La Jolla Rancheria. Because this grant had other antecedent claims on it, the court decided the Apis brothers could not prove they had continued possession and the confirmation was denied (Gates 1971:416). Even where Indians were relatively secure in their landholdings, neighboring Whites frequently interfered with their 114 water supply and imposed exhorbitant fines for damages

done by Indian livestock, sometimes confiscating their stock altogether.

Although President Grant's "Quaker policy" was sup-

posed to have introduced reform into the Bureau of Indian Affairs, few innovations were inaugurated. Controversy and mismanagement continued to characterize the government's efforts for California Indians. Native peoples in the southern part of the state were finally given a reservation under an executive order in January 1870 that established the San Pasqual Pala Reservation. Immediately, local citizens enraged at the thought of giving land to the Indians carried on an abusive crusade in San Diego newspapers against the establishment of the reservation. Indians were afraid to locate on the proposed reservation after hostile settlers threatened to kill any Indians who might do so. A deluge of protest regarding the reservation from local squatters persuaded the government to have the reservation returned to the public domain (ARCIA 1870:92). In the San Joaquin Valley a new Tule River reservation was set aside by executive order in 1873, but removal to the proposed reserve of Indians and government property was prevented when government inspectors condemned it as unsuitable for reservation purposes. In 1877 another reservation was established on the waters of the Tule River embracing 91,837 acres. This site was approved and natives were removed to their new home. Southern Indians gained relief between 1875 and 1877 when a series of executive orders created 13 separate reservations for the so-called Mission Indians (Ipai and Tipai, Luiseño, Serrano, Cupeño, and Cahuilla although some of these peoples were never really missionized). These reservations, which together reserved over 203 square miles or 130,000 acres of land to southern California Indians, were usually located on or near native villages. Over the next 30 years they sometimes had various parts returned to the public domain or enlarged by acts of Congress. Unlike larger reservations to the north, the Mission Indian reservations were administered from one central agency located in San Bernardino. This made contact with the Indians difficult since some of the reservations were over 100 miles away. These reservations served as the first of many moderate-sized reservations to be established for the homeless "Mission Indians" (Dale 1949:80-94).

Church influences in the Indian Service prompted the inauguration of the first government efforts at providing elementary education for California Indians. In 1871 government day schools were established on the reservations at Hoopa Valley and Round Valley. About 100 students were enrolled at Round Valley with an average attendance of 45, while at Hoopa attendance was considerably lower. Many traditionalists among the Indians opposed education and missionary work on the reservations, believing that these institutions were contributing to the undermining and disintegration of native culture. At Hoopa the traditionalist influence prevailed and ultimately caused the school to be closed in 1876 due to lack of attendance (ARCIA 1876:12-14).

Despite the progress made in establishing new reservations and schools for native people, the Indian Service continued to suffer from mismanagement and incompetence. The Indian agent at Hoopa Valley without government authorization allowed White sharecroppers to harvest grain on the reservation in 1876 in return for a percentage of the total harvest. Apparently this situation proved so scandalous that the agent was removed and the administration of the reservations was turned over to the army. The military authorities were shocked to discover that the former agent had allowed the gristmill, houses, barns, and sawmill to fall into a dilapidated and useless condition. Even more shocking was the realization that the former agent had sold wagons, thrashing machines, reapers, mowers, and other farm tools to neighboring Whites at mere nominal costs. This caused considerable discontent among the Indians who wanted to farm their land but were unable to because their tools had been sold. It was also discovered that the agent had sold Indian Service hay to the army for \$44.00 a ton while offering it to local Whites for \$1.50 per ton. Unfortunately fraud and misconduct were not confined to Hoopa. The Tule River agent reported in 1879 that a large grove of valuable timber on the reservation could not be used by the Indians:

I would therefore recommend the restoration to the public domain a strip four miles wide along the entire eastern boundary of the reservation. This would enable the people living in the plain country to open up roads to this timber and supply themselves with lumber . . . The government would also realize a profit, if not directly in the sale of this timber, indirectly in the improvement of large tracts of lands contiguous to it. Justice would then be meted out to all parties, and every pretext for complaint of the Indian service removed. Citizens would have their just rights and the timber be taken where Providence evidently designed it should (ARCIA 1879:12).

By the end of the decade, it was painfully apparent that President Grant's "Quaker policy" had failed to bring about reform of the Indian Service and had in fact merely introduced the church as yet another hostile factor to the situation confronting California natives. Final admission by the government of its failure to bring about reform of the Indian Service was evident when the government stopped assigning Indian agents from the Episcopalian orders after 1881.

Land Status and Legal Status

Over the next two decades the federal government became increasingly concerned with providing education to Indian people throughout the country. At this time sentiment within the federal government strongly favored the detribalization of Indian people and their gradual integration into the economy of the nation.

Since tribes could no longer support themselves due to the destruction of their traditional economy, the government proposed to train the Indians in the ways of Whites so that they might survive. In order to achieve this, the government set out upon a course of self-righteous suppression and destruction of all vestiges of tribalism and Indian culture. The philosophy, methods, and objectives of Indian education were originated at Carlisle, the first federal boarding school. With acculturation as a rationale, the method of enforcement was coercion. Indian youths were abducted from their homes, to be taught basic English and vocational trades. Native languages were forbidden and all aspects of Indian culture and values were suppressed. The government also hoped to benefit from this policy because they reasoned that a detribalization policy would result in assimilated Indians willing to sell the millions of acres of valuable land still held by tribes nationwide. It was within this framework of national policy that the educational programs for California Indians were established.

In California three types of educational programs were established for native peoples. The first was the federal government reservation day school. The second type was the boarding school fashioned after Carlisle. And finally, the nearby public school that allowed Indians to attend began a slow though steady increase in popularity among policymakers.

Although the Indian Service reservation day school was introduced in California a decade earlier, the real effort to establish widespread elementary education for native peoples began in 1881. This action was primarily taken to establish day schools for the thousands of Indians under the newly established Mission Agency reservations in southern California. The number of day schools throughout the state increased until 1888, when the Indian Service ruled that schools with fewer than 20 students be closed. After this time a steady decrease in the number of day schools occurred as it became more difficult to fill the classroom from a steadily decreasing Indian population. The day school had many obstacles to success. In drought years large decreases in school attendance were noted as parents took their children from their arid reservations in search of work. Another serious problem resulted from the gathering of Indian children in small ill-ventilated school rooms, which inevitably spread communicable disease. Sickness resulting in absenteeism closed many day schools throughout this period. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the success of the day school was opposition from parents who "objected to the school because they wish their children to grow up as Indians" (ARCIA 1891:220).

Older Indians quickly recognized the threat the schools offered to Indian culture and values. As a result considerable resistance to the schools developed. Native peoples destroyed the day school at Potrero in 1888 and burned the school at Tule River in 1890. At Pachanga a 115 Luiseño named Venturo Molido burned the school and assassinated the school teacher in 1895 (ARCIA 1895:131). Despite widespread opposition to the day school, native people were to learn they were far less destructive of Indian communities than boarding schools

According to the Carlisle government school philosophy, the best way to make an Indian assimilate into the White world was to remove him from the "corrupting and backward" influences of his parents. To carry out this philosophy, which the Indian Service made mandate, the government introduced the boarding school to California in 1881 at Tule River Reservation. Boarding schools were established at Round Valley in 1883, Middletown in Lake County in 1885, Hoopa Valley Reservation and Perris in 1893, and Fort Bidwell in 1898.

The Indian Service made school attendance compulsory in 1891. Typical recruitment methods practiced by Indian agents were included in this agency report from Hoopa: "to compel the children to attend school he [the agent] has decided that no issue of clothing will be made to the children unless they go to the agency school" (ARCIA 1883:15). Boarding school attendance had an even greater effect upon the lives of Indians than the day school. For instance, severe mental anguish resulted from the forced separation of children from their families. Similar to earlier indenture laws and slavery, boarding schools practiced what they called an "outing system" (Pratt 1964). This was a system in which Indian children were used as domestics in nearby White homes, which served the dual purpose of preventing children from visiting their families during vacations while exploiting their labor with only token remuneration.

Like the day schools, boarding schools were plagued with infectious diseases and encountered stiff opposition from students and parents alike. When the Mission Agency boarding school at Perris, California, first opened, an epidemic of influenza attacked 80 percent of the children and nearly caused the school to close. Student opposition to conditions within these institutions was forcibly expressed when five boys at the Round Valley School burned it to the ground in 1883. Yet despite their unpopularity among California natives the boarding school enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the Indian Service and continued to replace and supplant the day school system.

Together with the education program the Indian Service's "Civilization Division" helped create a mechanism for the extension of health services to California Indians. This was prompted by the realization that the Indian population was continuing to decrease due primarily to sickness, poor living conditions, and extreme poverty. There is no evidence that a system of health care was established in the state before 1890. That year it was reported that a few doctors were contracted to periodically administer health care to Indians within the var-

ious agencies of the state. Another feature of this program was the introduction of field matrons who acted as practical nurses and provided sanitary advice to native households. Yet little good resulted from these early efforts at health care. Because of long distances between reservations and agency headquarters, doctors could not effectively reach those in most need. Further illnesses were universally complicated by the undernutrition and lack of adequate shelter. Finally this program intensified the persecution of native medicine men already hounded by Christian missionaries and school officials.

Between 1880 and 1900 two diametrically opposed forces within the government shaped the land situation in California. The first was the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887. This law was aimed primarily at large eastern tribes and called for the breaking up of communal tribal landholdings and the allotment of 160 acres of reservation land to family heads. The philosophy behind this law was forced assimilation of the Indian into the White landholding system of private property. On the other hand the acquisition of numerous reservations was authorized by an Act of Congress dated January 12, 1891 (26 Stat. 712-714) and amended in 1898. These acts were responsible for the purchase of nearly all the 17 reservations established during this period. These opposing tendencies-breaking up tribal landholdings while establishing tribal landholdings-confused the Indians, created suspicion and distrust, and finally added to problems already facing various reservations throughout the state.

Fourteen of the 17 reservations established were in the Mission Agency of southern California. Although the amount of land granted the "Mission Indians" under this and earlier acts was large, nine-tenths of it was practically worthless. Most southern California reservations were barren and unable to support their populations. Lack of adequate water supply was the major reason for this situation, which was "brought about by the White settlers diverting the waters of streams . . . from which the Indians obtain their supply of water" (ARCIA 1897:117).

Other complications occurred when the railroads were granted alternate sections of land along their right of way. Many reservations became chopped up in checkerboard fashion. Oftentimes Indians found their villages or fields belonged to the railroads. A lack of clearly identifiable boundary markers for many reservations created problems as squatters began to encroach upon Indian lands. In 1888 the government got tough with these interlopers and successfully removed them from Morongo and Capitan Grande reservations. However, when it attempted to do the same in the long-troubled Round Valley Reservation, the squatters got an injunction against the army and succeeded in preventing the government from consolidating the reservation.

While the government was attempting to establish reservations for the state's native peoples it was at the same time trying to comply with the Dawes Act. Native people understood full well the implications of allotment and offered considerable resistance. Nevertheless the Bureau of Indian Affairs began ordering allotments of various sizes at Rincon, Morongo, and Pala reservations in 1893. The next year allotments were begun at Round Valley Reservation. By the turn of the century 1,615 individual allotments were made among eight reservations in the state. Although most tribes were coerced into agreeing to the dividing up of their reservation landholdings the Ipai-Tipai at Mesa Grande refused to be intimidated and threatened to kill any allotment agents on the reservation.

Surprisingly, the government, prompted by concerned liberals in the East, began to fight legal battles to assist Indians threatened by ejection from confirmed Mexican land grants. In 1885 the Bureau of Indian Affairs employed an attorney to defend tribes in such cases. The Indian Rights Association paid all legal costs and received a favorable decision in the State Supreme Court case Byrne v. Alas et al. in 1888. The court ruled that Indians could not be legally ejected from Mexican land grants. At this time the Cupeños from Warner's Ranch began a suit to stop their eviction (fig. 5) that ultimately reached the Supreme Court.

The two decades before the turn of the century might be characterized as an era of acculturation under duress; however, the deliberate undermining of native culture by government education, health programs, and allotment did not go unanswered. Although resistance was haphazard it was continous. In 1886 the Indians at Tule River burned the agency headquarters. The steady destruction of schools might also be characterized as a form of resistance. Native people successfully harassed and destroyed private property of Indians who collaborated too readily with the Indian Service. Field matrons were evicted from reservations when they attempted to lay claim to reservation property. Finally, the outright refusal by some natives to comply with allotment policies points out native determination to resist total submission.

While widespread attention by the government was called to instances of resistance, little recognition was given native-initiated adaptation to their rapidly changing world. When the Luiseño at Temecula were evicted by White squatters in 1882 they relocated from the valleys to the foothills where they dug wells with great labor to develop domestic waters. Even more significant was the adaptation and initiative shown by the small band of Yokayo Pomos who successfully purchased their own home site in 1881. At this time no reservation or government assistance was provided for these people. Recognizing that their entire tribe and culture might disintegrate if they could not stay together, their headmen decided to purchase a tract of good land for their people. After collecting nearly \$1,000 from their people the



Southwest Mus., Los Angele

Fig. 5. Cupeño Indians' camp on Pauma Ranch after their eviction from their traditional home at the hot springs of Warner's Ranch (Agua Caliente). Photograph by Sawyer of the Los Angeles Herald, May 1903.

headmen selected a 120-acre site near the Russian River and made the down payment. The Yokayo group prospered; they paid the entire balance owed on their land and even saved enough to purchase farm machinery shortly thereafter (Kasch 1947).

By 1900, after 131 years of foreign colonization and domination, there were approximately 16,000 to 17,000 native Californians (Kroeber 1957a). Yet the Indian Service reported in 1900 that only 5,497 had received government aid of any kind and of that number 1,317 received only education and medical services (ARCIA 1900:638). The Indian Service through administrative fiat alone denied welfare aid and health services to nonreservation Indians, which through a confusion of authority resulted in state and county aid being withheld to these unfortunate bands and individuals as well. There can be no doubt that the impact of this drastic demographic change and hardships had reduced these onceproud owners of this land to a severely demoralized and hopeless condition. Government reports and Indian testimony constantly called attention to the widespread hunger and destitution Indians suffered during the years after the turn of the century. This testimony by an Ipai-Tipai woman serves to illustrate not only the hunger that haunted her people but also the cultural breakdown that accompanied it: "Some Indians made necklaces of shells, but we didn't. We always needed more food; we were poor and never had time for necklaces. I don't know how to make those things now, only how to find food" (Cuero 1968: 57).

Indeed conditions did seem to be worse than ever; however, the humanitarianism in which White Americans take such an inordinate pride did manage to stir a few reformers to take an active interest in the welfare of California Indians.

Although Indian Service response to Indian welfare organizations varied from cooperation to federal indictments for conspiracy against the government, the Bureau of Indian Affairs was embarrassed into action. In 1906 Congress authorized an investigation into the conditions among homeless Indians in California and the development of some plan for their improvement. This resulted in the appropriation of \$100,000 for purchase of land and water development for the state's native people (34 Stat. 333).

Indian interest groups brought pressure on the government to provide better health services as well as more land. State health authorities argued that since Indians lived on nontaxpaying reservations, they must look to federal authorities for health care. In response to this and some progressive public concern the Indian Service gradually began to expand its services. In 1912 Congress initiated a survey of Indian health conditions that reported that Indian people suffered a 15 percent overall infection of tuberculosis as well as trachoma, an infec-118 tious eye disease that eventually causes blindness. At

federal boarding schools these rates were considerably higher due to inadequate sanitary conditions.

The first permanent Indian hospital established in California was located at the new nonreservation boarding school Sherman Institute at Riverside in 1901. By 1930 six others were in operation throughout the state. In 1924 public health nurses were allowed to assist in the Indian Service health work.

Despite the Indian Service's establishment of a separate administrative division for health in 1924, the effectiveness of its program must be regarded with severe doubt. Serious problems for the state's native people developed when by administrative fiat alone the Bureau of Indian Affairs decided to limit health care to reservation residents, thus leaving perhaps as many as one-third of the state's Indians in a legal limbo. These unfortunate bands and individuals were denied state health care because they were Indians and unable to get help from the federal government because they had no land. Substandard or incompetent care in tuberculosis institutions probably accounted for the fact that these early hospitals had a reputation for being places where people went to suffer and die. Charges of criminal neglect and incompetence were often leveled against the health service personnel. A severe smallpox epidemic among Pit River tribes in the winter of 1921-1922, complicated by starvation and a lack of medical care, prompted the government to launch an investigation into charges of willful neglect against the health service in 1929 (U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Indian Affairs 1929-1939: 579). Perhaps sensing the severe shortcomings of the health program the government later admitted that "even if they [government doctors] provided minimally satisfactory medical treatment they took too little interest in related aspects of Indian community life" (Raup 1959:12). By ignoring the impact of poverty and starvation and its relation to general health conditions, the government shifted attention from its failings by stepping up attacks on shamans and blaming their influences for poor sanitary conditions.

Land problems continued to be a paramount issue to the survival of Indians as a people. Responding to pressure groups and Indian demands Congress initiated a series of acts beginning in 1906 to provide land for homeless Indians in California. By 1930, 36 reservations were set aside for native Californians. These reservations were scattered throughout 16 northern counties and were mostly home sites or rancherias between five and a few hundred acres each. In southern California none of the many landless bands or individuals were provided with home sites as a result of these appropriations. For the most part these federal funds were used to enlarge existing reservations and improve water systems. Although the establishment of these reservations and rancherias was of immense importance, still there were millions of acres of land excellent for agriculture, grazing, and timber held by the government at this time, so little of it was made available to native people.

An important part of native land problems was the almost complete lack of domestic water and irrigation systems on reservations throughout the state, particularly in the south. The federal government began to develop water projects for California Indians with funds provided by Congress in 1906. Shortly the Bureau of Indian Affairs began digging wells on several Mission Agency reservations. These projects brought temporary relief; however, not all government water systems were satisfactory. For instance the Sequoya League reported in 1906 that an extraordinarily expensive (\$18,000) water system was built at Pala Reservation by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. This expensive project was a dozen times larger than there was land or water to irrigate. Furthermore, this engineering disaster was built on the side of a hill and incapable of delivering any water whatsoever! Despite the tribes' desperate need for water, irrigation projects caused intertribal controversies because the Indian Service conceived and carried out these programs with little or no consultation with reservation residents. During the 1920s tribesmen complained that irrigation projects were often constructed by the Indian Service with liens on allotted reservation lands. The right of Indians to water and the duty of the Indian Service to protect that right gradually became an issue as the government began to construct water projects. Unfortunately, the Indian Service seriously neglected its duty over the years. The Indian Service seemed very reluctant to bring those persons who impinged upon native water rights to court, as in the case of a White man near Palm Springs, who had diverted Indian water by building an irrigation project across the reservation. Instead of prosecuting him, the BIA simply bought his water project. In another case, 17 Indians from the Campo Reservation were convicted of tearing up an irrigation pipeline belonging to White ranchers. Apparently these Whites had diverted water upstream and laid a water pipe across a section of the reservation. The Bureau of Indian Affairs offered no legal advice or assistance to these people.

After the turn of the century the government's allotment program continued to force native people to accept the White system of private ownership of property by dividing native communal property into individual parcels of various size. By 1930 approximately 2,300 allotments had been made throughout the state. Yet a considerable number of these were surrendered or canceled because Congress failed to appropriate the necessary money. Nevertheless, a general opposition by more traditional native people continued against the detribalizing aims of the Allotment Act. Confidence in the Indian Service suffered as Congress failed to provide support. Failure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to confirm tentative allotments created an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust, even among Indians who cooperated with the government. At Palm Springs a team of surveyors entered the reservation in 1924 despite protests that the tribe had not been consulted as to their feelings about allotment. In response the headmen wired twice to the secretary of the interior:

We protest and ask that action be stopped at once and the Indians consulted.

We were not notified and don't want allotments, we have patent to our lands and want to hold them always together. Please stop surveyors . . .

> Pedro Chino, Capt. Francisca Patencio, Lee Arenas (Anonymous 1923)

There can be no doubt that the Bureau of Indian Affairs used allotment in an attempt to divide Indian communities and keep them politically impotent. The 1920s witnessed a series of court suits and countersuits among native communities over the distribution of allotments. These actions had the general effect of planting the seeds of family feuds among various tribes, the destructive and divisive influences of which still plague native communities today. At the head of organized opposition to allotment was the Mission Indian Federation. In a newspaper interview, Federation President Adam Castillo outlined the Indian Service's methods of securing allotments at the cost of disrupting native community life:

Non-Federation Indians, some from out of the county, were prevailed upon by H. E. Wadsworth, Special Indian Agent, sent to fix the claims to file for lands already cultivated. None of the allotees could point out as to where their land was located nor prove the lands were selected by them. Only those that were in good graces of the Indian agent and the government farmer had chosen land occupied by old Indians. Those living off the reservations never applied for nor selected any allotments. Mr. Wadsworth came to them as solicitor and persuaded them to fill out applications for five acre allotments (Castillo 1931).

Widespread opposition to the Dawes Act along with the realization by the government that allotted Indians were unable to compete economically in the American capitalistic-corporate society and that society was reluctant to accept Indians as equals, all prompted the Indian Services to begin to extend trusteeship over allotted lands for periods upward of 10 years. The result of this step was the total disruption of goals of the Dawes Severalty

Years of effort by Indians and their White allies to secure title to Indian villages on confirmed Mexican land grants came to a tragic climax in 1901. Despite earlier favorable court decisions in 1888 (Byrne v. Alas) the United States Supreme Court decided in 1901 against the right of the Cupeño Indians to retain their 119

homes at Warner's Hot Springs in Barker v. Harvey (181 U.S. 481). The Indians argued that Mexican law and Article 8 of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo recognized Indian right to villages on land grants, but the Court decided that: the Indians had failed to present their case to the Land Commission in the allotted time, the BIA had failed to bring about legislation to reaffirm title to these Indians, and the land actually belonged to Mission San Diego, which reported the land abandoned. This decision affected over 250 Indians scattered throughout several villages on confirmed land grants. At several villages native families locked themselves in their homes as sheriff's deputies broke down their doors with axes to evict them. With considerable pressure Indian interest groups forced Congress to appoint a commission to provide new homes for these evicted natives. Soon a ranch in the Pala Valley was purchased and the dispossessed Cupeños removed to it in 1902 (ARCIA 1903:79).

Other bizarre land problems developed. In 1904 the Tule River Indian agent reported that several White men were making large claims on portions of timberland within the eastern border of the reservation. These White men claimed to have had patent to this land and had begun to cut timber. A survey indicated that extensive fraud had been perpetrated to gain possession of this most valuable asset of the reservation. Twenty-nine years later the Bureau of Indian Affairs reported that the city of San Diego condemned the E1 Capitan Reservation to establish a municipal water system. The Indian Service did not fight the condemnation proceedings, and the Indians were displaced. These problems and others like them made most responsible Indian leaders extremely cynical about the government's role as protector of Indian interests.

Like the Allotment Act, the government education system was aimed primarily at detribalizing California Indians. After 1900 the Indian Service began to realize that the best method of reaching this goal would be the widespread enrollment of native children in public schools. After 1917 the Bureau of Indian Affairs began making contractual agreements with the State Department of Education for paying cost in lieu of taxes for the admission of Indian students to public schools where available (a few native children were admitted to public schools under similar circumstances as early as 1881). However, racial and cultural intolerance against native children was widespread and prevalent. Segregated public schools for Indian children were established in some areas. It was also common for Indian children to be refused admittance to public schools because they lacked shoes and clothing. After 1917 a relative decline in federal Indian school construction and attendance occurred and the public school Indian enrollments soared.

Despite the increased enrollment in public schools, as many as one-third of all Indian students continued to

attend federal Indian schools until 1948. Unlike the public schools, the Bureau of Indian Affairs schools always included vocational training. This training was built upon the concept of the Indian girl as an ultimate house servant and the Indian boy as a farm hand. These schools were habitually plagued by institutional problems. For example, before the Depression a special investigating committee complained that the 20¢ a day subsistence allowance for each student was not enough to provide the minimum protein requirements. School officials argued inadequate funding forced them to rely too heavily upon students for purely institutional upkeep. In 1929 Congressional hearings revealed that at some schools Indian children were continually exhausted from this type of work while many White employees held outside jobs. In 1931 the commissioner of Indian affairs reported that several cases of brutality to Indian children resulted in the dismissal of several employees from the service. At Hoopa, the government school made Christian church services and Sunday school mandatory. By far the greatest institutional obstacle to successful federal schooling was the enormous annual turnover in teachers, sometimes as high as 48 percent. These problems were obvious to students who in response reacted negatively to the oppressive atmosphere surrounding them. At Round Valley Boarding School students burned down the girls' dormitory in 1911. The next year the temporary dormitory was set fire twice. Finally in 1914 the boys attempted to burn their dormitory twice and succeeded in destorying the main school building. However, the most common form of resistance offered (like resistance to the mission system) was simply to withdraw. In 1926 the government could not report one student in any grade above 10. They simply quit. Noted educator Georganna Caroline Carden commented upon the overall education of California Indian children in 1926: "Their education has been perfunctory characterized at best by condescending kindliness and at worst by well-nigh criminal neglect" (Carden

In general, the whole atmosphere of forced assimilation of the Indian into White ways was the result of undemocratic decision-making within the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The years between the turn of the century and depression were characterized by greater and greater interference by the Indian Service in every aspect of native life. Reservation leaders found it impossible to secure tribal funds for urgent reservation needs, because the Bureau of Indian Affairs controlled all funds. The Indian Service continued to appoint reservation leaders over traditional or popularly elected leaders. One of the most damaging aspects of the government's interference in native community life was its increased persecution of native customs and religious practices. In 1902 the Bureau of Indian Affairs advised reservation agents:

You are therefore directed to induce your male Indians to cut their hair, and both sexes to stop painting. . . . Noncompliance with this order may be made a reason for discharge or for withholding rations and supplies . . . Indian dances and so-called Indian feasts should be prohibited. . . . Feasts are simply subterfuges to cover degrading acts and to disguise immoral purposes. . . . The government has a right to expect a proper observance of rules established for their good. . . . There was no idea of interfering with the Indian's personal liberty . . . (ARCIA 1903:14-15).

To resist these laws and the great psychological pressure to conform to White society's standards required a great tenacity of spirit that seemed to sustain native resistance throughout their history. Through the Indian Service's failure to adequately protect native water rights and a lack of suitable land, reservations continued to be non-self-supporting, forcing the Indians to seek employment in the White community.

This control and manipulation of Indians undoubtedly contributed to the mutual distrust and contempt between natives and Indian Service personnel. Reacting to the stifling paternalism of the Indian Bureau, a number of Indians at the Cahuilla Reservation killed the resident agent in 1913. As in earlier periods, reservation agents continued to bring scandal to the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The Indian agent at Morongo Reservation stole \$40,000 from his jurisdiction in 1929. Two years earlier, Indian Agent George J. Robinson and two sheriff's deputies were charged with murdering two Indians on the Campo Reservation.

By 1917 the legal status of the California Indian became a puzzling and confused issue. Without a doubt some Indians had for many years been regarded by the state and federal governments as citizens, paying taxes and voting. This became apparent when the federal government began to draft some Indians for the First World War. Although many were drafted many more noncitizen Indians enlisted and served with distinction in Europe. Partially in gratitude for their service in the First World War and partially to further assimilation goals of the government, in 1924 Congress conferred citizenship upon all Indians born in the United States. However, the BIA interpreted the granting of citizenship as not affecting its authority over the tribal and individual property of Indians and therefore insured its continual control over Indian lives, property, and resources by extraconstitutional means.

In 1930 the native population in the state numbered about 19,212 persons, of which approximately one-half lived on reservations, while the remainder generally lived in nearby rural communities. The conditions of native communities for the years during and after the Depression were characterized by complicated and often contradictory Bureau of Indian Affairs policies, which continued to hamper native community and economic

adaptation. Under the New Deal, Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier commented upon effects of its earlier policies:

As this [native] leadership was destroyed, it became more and more necessary for the government to deal with Indians as individuals, which, of course, served still further to destroy leadership, and thus set up a vicious circle of bureaucratic paternalism and resulted in disorganization among the Indians. This knifing of Indian leadership and emasculation of tribal organization, further aided by the separation of the Indian from his land and the destruction of his land estate through forced allotments, did work havoc with Indian culture, Indian energy, Indian group capacity, and Indian citizenship, but they were not effective in totally destroying the local democracy of the Indians (ARCIA 1941:13).

Government Indian policy after 1930 largely revolved around two opposing philosophies. The first of these called for a reconstitution of Indian tribes while the other simply demanded the withdrawal of all governmental services to Indians.

The earliest of these philosophies crystallized under Indian Commissioner Collier. Briefly Indian policy took a different direction as a result of the Wheeler-Howard Act (Indian Reorganization Act) of 1934. This legislation did three important things: it offered tribes an opportunity to reestablish corporate governments under certain regulation (previously outlawed by the Dawes Act of 1887 and the Curtis Act of 1898), it repealed the Dawes Act and stopped allotment, and finally it provided a revolving loan fund to stimulate tribal economic development. In support of the Indian Reorganization Act, Collier explained what had been obvious to native people all along, that the allotment law was a disaster. It was "principally an instrument to deprive Indians of their lands . . . of the lands owned by Indians in 1887 the year of the allotment law two-thirds have been lost by various processes of dissipation" (U.S. Department of the Interior 1933:108). It is significant that this legislation came in the middle of the nation's worst depression; perhaps the government found it absurd to preach rugged individualism to Indians while the entire economic order of America was collapsing. Ten California reservations and rancherias reconstituted themselves under Reorganization Act laws, while many others adopted other forms of governing councils to avoid the paternalistic overtones of Reorganization Act governments. Unfortunately, due to bureaucratic inertia, especially in the middle and upper echelons of the Indian Service, neither the tribes nor Collier could bring about overall reform in Indian policy. Reform depended upon the goodwill of Congress while power ultimately rested at the national and regional level and not at the democratically oriented tribal level. When the war came, budget cuts occurred as the nation turned to other concerns.

During the Second World War thousands of California Indians served in the armed forces. While many men were away, reservation economy underwent something of a boom. The Department of the Interior reported that although in the war year of 1944 individual income was approximately two and one-half times that of the 1938 level, one-third of the Indian families resident on the reservation still had annual incomes of less than \$500 and nearly two-thirds received less than \$1,000 (U.S. Department of the Interior 1946:351). Even Indian groups with potentially multimillion-dollar land assets, like the Palm Springs Cahuilla, were unable to gain control of their land. These Indians were forced by the courts to grant security liens on their lands for questionable attorneys' fees and lived in abject poverty for many

The end of allotment brought a halt to the division of Indian trust lands and inaugurated attempts by the government to supplement existing reservations with grants of additional lands. Between 1933 and 1941 the Congress purchased approximately 6,492 acres of land adjacent to four southern California reservations.

While the native population slowly increased, health problems continued to plague Indian communities. Poor living conditions and poverty remained the root causes behind chronic infections of tuberculosis, trachoma, pneumonia, and other respiratory diseases. In response the government built and staffed six Indian hospitals in the state before the war, with a total capacity of only 164 beds. In 1938 the discovery of sulfanilamide made possible the treatment and cure of the painful and blinding trachoma eye disease.

Yet, despite this hopeful improvement in health service, the government at the same time expressed its intention to transfer its health responsibility to local, county, and state facilities as recommended in both the Meriam Survey of 1928 (Brookings Institution, Washington, Institute for Government Research) and the Hoover Commission survey of 1948. As a result of the 1948 recommendations, which included the government's termination policy, all BIA health services to California Indians were ended in 1955. As usual this policy was adopted without legislative authorization and despite protests by Indian people. There can be no doubt that the ending of health care and the closing of the Indian hospitals created unnecessary suffering and a confusion over county, state, and federal responsibility for Indian health needs. In April 1956 hundreds of Southern California Indians protested government policy: "We Indians urgently request Congress to re-open the Soboba Indian Hospital located at the Soboba Indian Reservation, Riverside, California, for the Indians that need medical care. At present, many Indians report that they have been turned down, when they try to enter the county hospital, and finally being accepted only when it is too late, in many cases death being the result"

(California Legislature. Senate Interim Committee on California Indian Affairs 1957:55). Unfortunately, this confused situation continued for California Indians until

In the late 1920s and early 1930s the Indian Service continued to abandon the federal day schools throughout the state and began to limit enrollment of California Indian students at Sherman Institute. As a result, native children were admitted to public schools in ever-increasing numbers.

Termination

After the war, as the United States spent millions of dollars rebuilding Germany and Japan, the government hoped to rid itself of its embarassing failure to "rebuild" Indian nations by simply withdrawing government aid to Indian people. This philosophy was expressed in the Hoover Commission survey of 1948. Indeed that year the Bureau of Indian Affairs declared its intention to "terminate" all government services to all Indians and divide their tribal assets (land and resources) among individuals. This so-called new policy was little more than a warmed-over version of the Allotment Act. Its implementation would detribalize native groups and put their property on tax rolls as well as repudiate the federal government's moral commitment and responsibility to aid the people whose poverty and powerlessness it had

California Indian tribes were to be among the first targets for termination. The commissioner of Indian affairs who inaugurated this policy, Dillon Meyer, was principally known as the man responsible for administering Japanese-American concentration camps during World War II. In 1952 the Bureau of Indian Affairs began to energetically push termination: the Indian Service introduced to Congress several termination bills specifically for California, and in anticipation of that policy the government ended all Indian Service welfare payments to pauper Indians in the state. In addition, the Indian Service began an accounting and inventory survey of all government property buildings and equipment, while the BIA sold 129 allotments and closed the accounts of hundreds of Indians having money in trust. In 1953 Congress passed Public Law 280, which brought California Indian reservations under the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the state. This was significant because before this time some tribes were able to exercise police powers in their own community. In 1953 also the California State Senate created the Senate Interim Committee on Indian Affairs, composed entirely of non-Indians, to aid the federal government in making the transition of Indian Services and property to state jurisdiction. This committee made inquiries and wrote recommendations, most of which were ignored.

It soon became apparent to the government that the Indians did not want termination. In fact, all the government's preliminary actions for termination caused considerable suffering and confusion among Indians whose many services had already been abruptly cut off, while county and state agencies were expected to fill the void. In 1953 the county of San Diego refused to provide welfare for a reservation Indian on grounds that reservation residence made her ineligible. In Acosta v. County of San Diego the court ruled that residence on an Indian reservation does not disqualify an Indian otherwise eligible for general assistance. Other problems with the termination policy arose. In 1956 Indians complained to the governor that Section 2B of Public Law 280 was being violated by the state as welfare and old-age pensions were cut off because Indians refused to sell their land. At a large and representative meeting of southern California Indians during that year, a petition was sent to the

We Indians request the repeal of Public Law 280. This has not worked out because the sheriffs are called and do not come. In cases they have been known to arrive three or four days later, when emergencies were reported. Indians are afraid to sign complaints since the sheriffs do not come when called and they are afraid they will be beaten, for without the law to turn to what can they do? One evening the sheriffs were called and did not come out. That same evening a murder took place. No sheriff came out until they were called again the following day (California. Legislature. Senate Interim Committee on California Indian Affairs 1957:55).

Overall the undemocratic policymakers who literally attempted to stampede Indians into termination were generally opposed by a majority of tribes and rancherias who knew better than anyone that it would destroy their culture and rob them of their lands.

The longer the controversy over termination raged the more arbitrary and scandalous the BIA's coercion of disorganized and powerless rancherias became. Hoping to gain quick legislative authorization for its questionable policies ending nearly all federal services for the state's native people Congress acted in 1958 by passing the Rancheria Act (27 Stat. 619 as amended by 78 Stat. 390). This act authorized the method by which Indian groups could vote to terminate themselves. Considerable pressure and persuasion were used to encourage Indians, especially small and powerless rancherias, to agree to terminate. Surely few of the people who came under those pressures knew or understood their rights on trust property or the consequences of losing the trust status of their land. Eventually 36 rancherias voted to terminate for financial reasons, which resulted in the loss of 5,000 acres of trust property.

The decade of the 1960s witnessed the long and drawn-out battles between Indian leadership and the government to gain compensation for nineteenth-century land losses through the Land Claims cases (see "Litigation and Its Effects," this vol.). Government pol-

icy throughout this period continued to attempt the gradual withdrawal of the remaining government services to the state's Indians. Although the state legislature opposed termination in 1954, the state government created the successor to the Senate Interim Committee on Indian Affairs in 1961, called the State Advisory Commission on Indian Affairs. This commission was to investigate and make recommendations regarding termination and other aspects of Indian policy. All Commission members were non-Indian. This paternalistic approach toward Indian problems caused native people to react when a bill that would have made the commission a powerful state agency was introduced to the legislature in 1968. Indians managed to amend the bill so it would establish an all-Indian commission. However, the state's elitist posture was obvious when the commission chairman, Sen. William Coombs, killed the bill in committee. The commission ran into further problems the next year when the California Indian Education Association brought two lawsuits against it dealing with the "open meetings and public record laws" and immunity of legislators from civil process.

Yet another Bureau of Indian Affairs program that seriously affected the California Indians' political position in the state was the government's relocation program (employment assistance). This program was part of the government's nationwide attempt to depopulate reservations by bringing Indians into urban areas for vocational training and job assistance. The Bureau of Indian Affairs hoped that the Indians would remain in the city and gradually disappear into the melting pot of the urban proletariat. The government estimates that since the beginning of the relocation program as many as 60,000 to 70,000 out-of-state Indians have settled in the Los Angeles or San Francisco bay area. This accounts for more than one-half the relocated Indians in the United States. Unfortunately many of these relocated Indians, who had permanently abandoned their tribes and economically and politically socialized into the dominant society, were able to gain considerable political power by getting leadership positions in California Indian affairs. This situation had the dual effect of stunting the growth of a native California leadership in statewide affairs, while placing urban Indians in positions of power in some cases over the affairs of rural and reservation native people.

With the withdrawal of health services for California Indians the already poor health conditions of native people deteriorated further. Leading causes of death were reported to be tuberculosis, cirrhosis of the liver, accidents, influenza, pneumonia, congenital malformation, and diseases of early infancy. Death from these conditions occurs at rates from 1.7 (for congenital malformations) to 6 times (for tuberculosis) rates of death from the same causes among non-Indians. These problems are aggravated by conditions of poor housing and sanita-

tion, lack of employment, and poor nutrition. A lack of medical facilities near the reservation, transportation problems, and sometimes delays by local health officials all prevented prompt care and contributed to the decline in the general health of California Indians. This history of inadequate health care was responsible for a lowering of the life expectancy for Indians to 42 years, compared to the average of 62 years for the general population. This tragedy is not confined to the adults alone. The infant death rate is 41.8 deaths in 1,000 live births, which is 70 percent higher than the rate for infants in the population as a whole (California State Advisory Commission on Indian Affairs 1966:40).

Perhaps one of the most significant events in recent Indian history has been the establishment of the California Indian Demonstration Health Project. This program originated in the State Department of Public Health Bureau of Maternal and Child Health in 1967. Nine projects were set up among reservation communities throughout the state. Funded by state and federal health departments these pilot projects stressed Indian participation and control and have acted as a catalyst for community cooperation in bringing medical and dental health services to rural and reservation Indians. These projects were at first staffed by volunteer doctors and dentists, but eventually funding increased to allow payment for their services. By 1973, 16 projects had been set up on reservations and rural areas throughout the state. Each project is governed by a local all-Indian committee and is almost completely autonomous. Statewide coordination is supplied by the California Rural Indian Health Board, made up of project representatives. Although hard data are lacking, the impact of this new approach to Indian health has been extremely encouraging. Not only has this program provided desperately needed health care, but it has allowed policies of self-determination to grow under its structure. After decades of stifling paternalism by various government projects this is indeed a healthy change.

While termination battles occupied Indian leadership, attention was diverted from critical issues of education, which became shockingly apparent to the state in 1965. It was at this time that the Division of Labor Statistics and Research published a review of statistics that discredited the entire history of Indian education in the state. The report stated that 5 percent of all rural or reservation Indians had received no schooling at all, while 43 percent had not gone beyond the eighth grade, and as many as 57 percent had completed less than one year of high school. The dropout rate for Indians was reported three times higher than among non-Indians; some schools reported a 30 percent to 75 percent rate of Indian student withdrawal (California Department of Industrial Relations. Division of Labor Statistics and Research 1965:10). At the same time a national test re-124 ported that Indian students in the twelfth grade had the poorest self-image of all minority groups examined. The California State Advisory Commission on Indian Affairs (1966:39) attributed the failure of education for the Indian to "the lack of teacher concern or the failure of the school system to devise compensatory teaching techniques to cope with students of differing cultural backgrounds."

Three years later a senate investigating committee made a scathing denunciation of both federal and public education for American Indian youth. Senate investigators visiting Sherman Institute reported finding an inadequate staff both administratively and academically. Other deficiencies there included inadequately identified goals, outdated vocational training, a severe shortage of counselors, and little vigor on the part of the administration in defending the interest of the students. That year newly readmitted California Indians could find little improvement over public schools in what an unnamed investigator termed the "rigid uncompromising, bureaucratic, authoritarian, non-innovative feudal barony" that controlled Sherman (U.S. Congress. Senate. Special Subcommittee on Indian Education 1969:75). The committee found conditions in public schools almost as deplorable. Public schools reflecting the values and judgments of White middle-class communities exhibited a selfrighteous racial and cultural bigotry. These attitudes, the lack of accurate library material on Indians, and the distorted and biased American history texts all contribute to the alienation of Indian youth.

Organized efforts on the part of California Indian people to deal specifically with the problems of false and inaccurate textbooks were begun by the American Indian Historical Society in 1964. This all-Indian organization of scholars and native historians testified before the California State Curriculum Commission: "We have studied many textbooks now in use, as well as those being submitted today. Our examination discloses that not one book is free from error as to the role of the Indian in state and national history. We Indians believe everyone has the right to his opinion. A person also has the right to be wrong. But a textbook has no right to be wrong, or to lie, hide the truth, or falsify history, or insult and malign a whole race of people" (Henry 1970:7). The Historical Society then presented criteria for the adoption of statewide history and social-science books that deal with American Indians; however, despite hard work and initiative taken by Indian people the commission has so far ignored these recommendations. In addition, the American Indian Historical Society founded one of the first all-Indian scholarly journals, The Indian Historian. Long-time tribal chairman of the Cahuilla Reservation, Indian activist Rupert Costo was the founder and first president of the American Indian Historical Society. Since its establishment the Society has founded a publishing house and inaugurated in 1973 an Indian monthly newspaper, Wassaja.

Another significant development contributing to increased reservation and rural Indian involvement in education was the founding of the California Indian Education Association in 1967. This organization conducted the first all-Indian, Indian-controlled conference on education in the United States. The large and representative Indian membership has held several statewide conferences to discuss the problems of Indian youth in both federal and public schools. Briefly, the Association has recommended more involvement by Indian people at all levels of the educational process. In the public schools it has called for: Headstart programs for preschool children, teacher-training programs to help instructors cope with special Indian learning problems, Indian counselors at the junior high and high schools, and more emphasis on the positive aspects of native heritage expressed in the entire curriculum. The Association has also recommended that Sherman Indian High School be governed by an all-Indian board of education. An increase in California Indian enrollment, curriculum changes to express Indian concepts, a lower studentteacher ratio, and accommodations for visiting parents are among the many projects this organization has pursued.

The Owens Valley Paiutes in 1968 acquired an Education Center on their reservation that has been successful in encouraging native students to complete high school and even go to college. The project has through community cooperation elected Indians to the local school board and has provided a good opportunity for Indian and White parents to discuss some racial problems in the community. The result has been favorable not only for students but also for employment opportunities for adults as well.

In order to give Indian students an even chance at gaining an education changes must be made in both federal and public schools in California. What shocks many people concerned with public education is the fact that since 1958 federal funds were supplied to various public school districts with high Indian student enrollment for such changes. Indian students have qualified at least 25 counties for federal monies through the Impact Aid (Public Laws 874 and 815) and Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act programs. Earlier California Indians attended public schools under provisions of the Johnson-O'Malley Act of 1934, which provided federal funding to local school districts to pay costs for reservation residents in lieu of local taxes. California Indians were told Impact Aid funds would replace Johnson-O'Malley monies, yet the statewide Impact Aid total never came near the annual \$318,000, supplied in 1953 under Johnson-O'Malley. The Bureau of Indian Affairs proposed that Impact Aid be used for public schools' general operating funds in lieu of taxes while Johnson-O'Malley funds could be used for special compensatory programs for Indian students. Yet Johnson-O'Malley funds were terminated in 1953. Thus Impact Aid money went into general operating budgets for public school districts, no special Indian programs were inaugurated, and local White landowners were given a tax break at the expense of Indians. In addition, Title I funds are difficult to locate and account for. Virtually all Indian students qualify to receive compensatory education services that this act is supposed to support. Yet only a handful of projects for Indians were undertaken throughout the entire state. Nationally, widespread abuse of Title I monies has been reported. A much closer accountability of these federal funds is necessary in order to insure that they are used for the benefit of Indian students for which they were intended.

The past years of federal and state Indian education programs in California have indeed been dismal failures. The problems began when the government attempted to change the Indian into the shadow of the White. This coercive assimilation policy by both the state and federal school systems has resulted in the school's becoming a kind of battleground where the Indian child attempts to protect his integrity and identity as an individual by defeating the purposes of the school. As a result a record of absenteeism, dropouts, negative self-image, low achievement, and ultimately academic failure has followed the great social engineering policies of the White race. Ultimate failure in education has insured the desperately severe and self-perpetuating cycle of poverty for the rural and reservation Indians.

California Indians can be justly proud that they have risen to the occasion and organized groups like the American Indian Historical Society and California Indian Education Association to insure a representative and scholarly Indian involvement at all levels of education. One example of this type of effective input from the state's Indians resulted in the reestablishment of Johnson-O'Malley funds in 1969-1970. However, obstacles continue to exist. Racist attitudes of the White community and its institutions continue to harass, sometimes by threatening job loss, those Indians who have become outspoken in demanding Indian rights. Long distances of many reservations and Indian communities from school board meetings and the lack of easily obtainable information on the use of Title I and Impact Aid funds both contribute to the lack of their effective involve-

Another important development since the 1960s was the creation of Native American Studies departments at major universities in California. In the fall of 1969 Indian students at the University of California at Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Davis and at Sacramento State University demanded that these institutions begin programs and offer courses on Indian culture and history. As a result, considerable academic research has been done in areas generally totally neglected by the academic community. Indian law programs and the graduate Public Health programs at Berkeley also offer advanced study programs for Indian students. These programs offer good opportunities for Indian students to train themselves in various professions that could be important to the future of Indian tribes and communities.

The 1970s

Despite advances made by these and other programs, the condition of the California Indian today remains a monument of disgrace to both the federal and state governments. A state report summarized the most outstanding problems of the reservation communities:

Housing is grossly inadequate: living conditions are crowded, existing houses are structurally poor, foundations are lacking, electrical wiring is faulty, houses generally do not furnish the minimum necessary protection from extreme climatic conditions, from 30 to 50 percent of the homes need replacement, and 40 to 60 percent need improvements or repairs. Sewage disposal facilities are unsatisfactory in 60 to 70 percent of cases; two county health departments report highs of 71 percent and 97 percent unsatisfactory conditions. Water from contaminated sources is used in 38 to 42 percent of the homes on California reservations; and water must be hauled, presumably under unsanitary conditions, in from 40 to 50 percent of all reservation homes (California State Advisory Commission on Indian Affairs 1966:32).

Of course all these problems have their origin in the poverty suffered by almost the entire Indian race.

Besides the government's bureaucratic bungling, the major reason for the vicious cycle of poverty among rural and reservation Indians remains lack of jobs. Indians have the highest rate of unemployment of any group in the state. The California State Advisory Commission (1966) reported that the median annual income for the reservation population was \$2,268 for each family. Incomes among California Indians in rural and urban areas are comparable. Lack of job opportunities can be traced to various sources. In rural California most work is seasonal and when jobs are found, commuting is expensive and inconvenient because of a lack of transportation or poor roads. Working away from the reservation usually consumes all earnings because of low wages and high cost of living. Indian education has done little to prepare Indians for jobs since most lack employment skills. Local prejudices also made it difficult for Indians to compete against Whites for jobs. Finally, poor quality land and a scandalous lack of water made economic development on the reservations all but impossible.

Even more disturbing than these accounts is the aftermath of the government's termination policy. Since 1958 several terminated rancheria populations have brought court action against the Bureau of Indian Affairs over responsibility of the Indian Service in carrying out provisions of the Rancheria Act. Specifically, they have charged the government with allowing both substandard

domestic water systems and housing to exist at the time of termination knowing full well that neither could meet county or state standards. They have also charged the Bureau of Indian Affairs with failure to: provide access roads to Indian land, prevent Whites from encroaching on rancheria lands, and make known opportunities for education and training under Section 9 of the Rancheria Act. The BIA task force reported that the loss of some rancheria land was due to sale to meet tax payments (Anonymous 1972:5).

By 1974, 10 of the original terminated rancherias have passed completely out of Indian ownership because of taxes and other forms of dissipation. As a result of these court actions the BIA surveyed terminated rancherias and concluded in 1972 that it would cost the government \$3,876,000 to correct deficiencies in the water systems and provide new housing. Unfortunately, the BIA did not make recommendations on the steady loss of land to taxes. Nearly four million dollars of improvements will simply hasten the loss of land because of higher tax-assessed land values. Therefore, whether the government provides the money for improvements or not, these communities will continue to lose their land either slowly or quickly unless the termination process is reversed.

The cultural survival of the Indians of California depends largely on two factors. First is the ability of Indian groups to maintain a tax-free land base on which to build a viable economy. The second is an awareness by Indian groups of not only their rights but also the value of their own cultural and social patterns. There have been encouraging signs in both of these areas.

The most significant issue facing California tribes in the 1970s is self-determination. "ONLY the Indians can solve their situation; only the INDIAN, with his own leadership and in his own way, can make headway" (Costo 1968:8). Driven to the depths of poverty from which they have yet to recover, the sovereignty of Indian communities has been steadily eroded by the government in its constant bungling attempts to force Indians into the melting pot. The Bureau of Indian Affairs keeps a stranglehold on native sovereignty by virtue of its administrative control over Indian land, resources, water, tribal funds, and a host of social services. With the BIA under the Department of Interior, conflicts continually arise from other agencies whose interests often adversely affect Indians, for example, the Department of Reclamation or the National Parks.

Closely related to the issues of sovereignty and selfdetermination is the powerless position Indians hold in the body politic of the state and nation. Because of their small and scattered numbers, there is no direct representation for Indians in the state legislature. Here Indians are dependent on goodwill rather than any reliable source of influence to affect legislation. Immediate self-determination is the only answer. The tedious reports of government task forces on Indian problems, which without exception are filed away and promptly forgotton, do not solve problems. Indian communities must be allowed to control all federal monies earmarked for the state's Indians. Until Indians cease to be the poorest and least powerful group of people in the state and regain much of their sovereignty the dreadful moral responsibility for their present pitiful condition will continue to weigh on the conscience of those individuals and institutions that practice a neocolonial policy toward Indians.

The future for the approximately 40,000 Indians of California is not certain; however, after 204 years of constant struggle the Indians have not accepted forced acculturation or proletarianization as an acceptable al-

ternative to their native culture and values. They have chosen instead to retain their Indianness at all costs. It is this tenacious spirit that has never totally accepted the White system and that has given strength and comfort throughout the California Indians' incredible struggles against forces that at times they could resist only with their hearts. Indians must be accepted by the dominant society on their own terms and allowed to develop their societies along their own lines. Francisco Patencio, longtime traditional leader of the Palm Springs Cahuilla, once put it very simply: "The way of the Indian was very hard. First they learned the way of the Spanish Fathers. Then they learned the way of the Mexicans. Then they had to learn again, very different, the way of the white man. So they could not please everyone" (Patencio 1943:68).